Results for “Arafat”

…nt of Arik’s visit was to dramatize his determination to keep it that way. The target of this political theatre was not Arafat or the Palestinians. It was the Israeli public, me, and my government. In an all-perfect world, I would have liked to find a way to block the visit. In a...

… a scintilla of hope. I believed that our continued diplomatic engagement might provide a counterweight to any moves by Arafat to revert to violence. It was also critical for Israel to retain the diplomatic, political and moral high ground we had earned in the eyes of the interna...

… a scintilla of hope. I believed that our continued diplomatic engagement might provide a counterweight to any moves by Arafat to revert to violence. It was also critical for Israel to retain the diplomatic, political and moral high ground we had earned in the eyes of the interna...

…ic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — had just been through dozens of hours of intricately detailed talks with each of Arafat’s top negotiators at Camp David, not to mention the dozens of other meetings before we had even got there. Now they had to accept that, even with the lid...

/ BARAK / 98 in legal and diplomatic terms, null and void. The package Arafat had ultimately rejected had not even been presented by me. It was an American proposal. Besides, it was obvious no serious negotiations were going to happen anyway for the foreseeable future. Arik, how...

…tly saw the stenographer’s record of my conversation with the President before he’d left, confirming the condition that Arafat accept the “pocket” at least as a basis on which to proceed. That evening, she apologized to me for the misunderstanding, and explained the mix-up to the...

… sides knew we’d have to make. I told our team we could not play that game. Until there was at least some movement from Arafat, I didn’t want them suggesting any Israeli concessions. We’d obviously get nothing in return. The summit would fail. Despite my repeated insistence both...

…ton and I met the next morning. My aim was to persuade him that the time had come for a make-or-break summit with Yasir Arafat. I suspected it would not be easy to convince him, and it wasn’t. But I made the argument that if we were to have any hope of moving Oslo forward, we no...

… sides knew we’d have to make. I told our team we could not play that game. Until there was at least some movement from Arafat, I didn’t want them suggesting any Israeli concessions. We’d obviously get nothing in return. The summit would fail. Despite my repeated insistence both...

…sident Carter’s shuttle diplomacy resulted in the Camp David Accords of 17 September 1978. In 1993, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat followed the precedent of President Sadat and broke ranks with fellow Arab leaders by secretly and bilaterally recognizing the State of Israel and signin...

Bibi is right about one thing. The negotiating challenges have become more difficult since Arafat’s refusal of our offer at Camp David. Arafat is no longer alive. Palestinian politics have become ever more fragmented and messy, not least as a result of the Hamas takeover of Gaza....

/ BARAK / 99 By the end of November, I believed that the chances of a peace agreement with Arafat were so microscopic as to border on non-existent, and that my own prospects for retaining sufficient support to be an effective Prime Minister much beyond Clinton’s departure were n...

/ BARAK / 98 in legal and diplomatic terms, null and void. The package Arafat had ultimately rejected had not even been presented by me. It was an American proposal. Besides, it was obvious no serious negotiations were going to happen anyway for the foreseeable future. Arik, how...

…tly saw the stenographer’s record of my conversation with the President before he’d left, confirming the condition that Arafat accept the “pocket” at least as a basis on which to proceed. That evening, she apologized to me for the misunderstanding, and explained the mix-up to the...

…irport, I faced the more immediate issue of ensuring my government survived. This was partly in case, against all odds, Arafat showed a readiness to revive the search for peace — but also because of the real prospect he would choose violence instead. Since the Knesset was about...