“because for him, Jerusalem was sacred from a strictly national and historic point
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/ BARAK / 90
“because for him, Jerusalem was sacred from a strictly national and historic point
of view.” It was for me as well. In fact, I think its religious significance probably
resonated more strongly. Still, the major change from the summit was that even
those Israelis who found a compromise on Jerusalem unacceptable recognized that,
if they did want to negotiate a definitive end to the conflict, talking about it was
unavoidable.
At least for now, however, there wasn’t going to be a peace deal. As our El Al
707 descended over the Mediterranean for our approach back to Ben-Gurion
Airport, I faced the more immediate issue of ensuring my government survived.
This was partly in case, against all odds, Arafat showed a readiness to revive the
search for peace — but also because of the real prospect he would choose violence
instead.
Since the Knesset was about to go into recess until late October, I would have a
three-month window to reshape and stabilize my coalition — but only if we could
weather a no-confidence motion introduced by Arik Sharon after Camp David. We
did weather it, barely. Arik needed a majority of the Knesset’s 120 seats to bring
down the government. The vote ended in a 50-50 tie. The other 20 MKs abstained,
or didn’t show up. This was not because of any enthusiasm for my efforts to get an
agreement at Camp David, but because of a /ack of enthusiasm for an early
election in which they feared losing seats.
Still, that did allow me to focus on the challenge of the inevitably altered
situation with Arafat after the summit’s collapse. My main concern was the
possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I’d phoned Shaul Mofaz and
Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet.
“Let’s hope the violence doesn’t come,” I told them. “But if it does, make sure we
are ready.” Though there was no sign of violence in the weeks immediately after
the summit, there was equally little sign of diplomatic engagement by Arafat.
Obviously relieved at the way Camp David had ended, he returned to Gaza to a
hero’s welcome, proudly proclaiming that he had refused to “give up” Jerusalem. It
was vintage Arafat: the “general” in his starched uniform and kefiyeh, fresh from
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