/ BARAK / 42 negotiations. The first stirrings of discontent had begun even before I went to see Clinton. On the basis of my commitment merely to try for peace, Arik Sharon had presented a no-confidence motion in the Knesset. It was never going to pass. But only days after I’d m...
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/ BARAK / 15 By November, even his Foreign Minister, David Levy, was making noises about quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabinet if it was going to bring the peace process to a halt. I warned Bibi, both in the Knesset and in a series of speeches, abo...
/ BARAK / 37 was coping in his trademark military uniform. Still, the mood music going into the meeting was encouraging. After the election, Arafat had tried to use his ties with the ayatollahs in Iran to get them to release 13 members of the tiny Jewish community in Shiraz who...
…early in the new year, was a small religious party called Meimad, inspired by an openly pro-peace Orthodox rabbi named Yehuda Amital and including a former Chief Rabbi of Norway, Michael Melchior. By the end of January 1999, several months before the real campaign, I was feeling...
/ BARAK / 73 explicit. I told President Clinton I could speak only for how I would respond if a state was indeed declared without a peace deal. “We will extend Israeli sovereignty over the major settlement blocs. We will establish a security zone in the Jordan valley, and let th...
/ BARAK / 79 Syrians. Then to Geneva to see Assad, “where I felt like a wooden Indian, doing your bidding. I will not let it happen here. I will simply not do it.” I tried to keep my voice steady when I replied. I explained that the issues we were addressing went to the heart o...
/ BARAK / 52 was now chief of staff, to ensure we had a plan to get our troops out as quickly and safely as possible once the order was given. But complex though the operational issues were, that was not the most difficult part. The withdrawal had not just a military aim, but a...
/ BARAK / 64 Chapter Twenty-Two If I believed in omens, I might have turned back as soon as we got to the summit. We reached Camp David a little before ten at night on July 10, after helicoptering from Andrews Air Force base near Washington. When we arrived, it was pouring with...
/ BARAK / 78 and refining our position on Jerusalem. I think Clinton expected a formal offer from us. Since I’d been guided by his request for a list of questions for Arafat, however, that is what we came to him with. As we’d discussed, I wanted finally to elicit some sign of wh...
/ BARAK / 8 Within days of the election, however, there was a new source of potential friction between us: Shimon’s future, and possibly mine, in leading our opposition to Bibi and bringing a Labor government back to power. The question of Peres’s leadership was unavoidable. La...
/ BARAK / 47 Whether the stories were true wouldn’t matter. They would still make the real bargaining necessary for peace far more difficult, perhaps even impossible. I also had doubts whether Assad was ready for real peace: embassies, open borders, personal contact between Syr...
/ BARAK / 61 wasn’t enough, David Levy, my Foreign Minister, told me he would not be joining me at Camp David. He wasn’t resigning, at least not yet. But he knew that the final decisions at the summit would be mine, he feared it would fail, and didn’t want to share in the conseq...
/ BARAK / 58 previous Israeli leader in trying to get that peace. I knew that he would press me to tell him how far that actually was. He didn’t ask directly. But each of his ostensibly theoretical questions was aimed at establishing whether I could give him enough for a summit...
/ BARAK / 44 Western envoys who had seen the Syrian president, that Assad’s many years of health problems had left him almost skeletally frail, even at times disoriented. Even my own negotiating team urged me to concentrate on the Palestinians instead. President Clinton kept st...
/ BARAK / 99 By the end of November, I believed that the chances of a peace agreement with Arafat were so microscopic as to border on non-existent, and that my own prospects for retaining sufficient support to be an effective Prime Minister much beyond Clinton’s departure were n...