Results for “University of International Business and Economics”

so we will focus on the insights garnered from Nash and directly

the conditions under which we expect players to avoid looking and attend to looking

where ch and cl are the magnitudes of the

cooperative interaction to player 1; and bp + d (1 − p ) is the expected payoff to

and the benefits from this trust outweigh the risk of

and those who cooperate without considering the prospect of reciprocation

as in DeScioli and Kurzban’s ( 2009 ) Side-Taking Game. The above

and taller men are more likely to be hired as CEOs

and we ourselves will not attend to effectiveness in equilibrium. This

provided others recognize it as a problem and

it would be common knowledge that we had the option to give and chose

on Kant’s concepts of autonomy and humanity

J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving.

J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion .

R. (2012). Why everyone (else) is a hypocrite: Evolution and the modular mind.