Where Arafat appears
208 total
ay prayers, in protest over Sharon’s visit. Danny called Dennis Ross. Madeleine Albright called Arafat, to urge him to ensure this didn’t happen. But as Dennis would remark later, “Arafat didn’t lift finger to stop it.” The trouble began th...
…’s visit was to dramatize his determination to keep it that way. The target of this political theatre was not Arafat or the Palestinians. It was the Israeli public, me, and my government. In an all-perfect world, I would have liked to find...
…lly, I got the answer only weeks after my return from the UN. * * * At the urging of the Americans, I invited Arafat and his negotiating team to a private dinner in Kochav Yair on the 25th of September. The atmosphere was surprisingly warm,...
hristians the world over. When Arafat spoke, it was almost as if the summit had never happened. “We remain committed to our national rights over East Jerusalem, capital of our state and shelter of our sacred sites, as well as our rights on...
…red losing seats. Still, that did allow me to focus on the challenge of the inevitably altered situation with Arafat after the summit’s collapse. My main concern was the possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I’d phoned Shaul...
…te.” But I told the President that we couldn’t just ignore what had happened at Camp David. Yes, in the event Arafat suddenly had second thoughts about the potentially historic achievement he’d passed up, he would know where to find me. But...
me as just another way Arafat had of conveying his bottom lines. It was a bit like stories he liked to tell about visiting his aunt in Jerusalem as 372 / BARAK / 87 a young boy and seeing religious Jews walking through the streets of the Ol...
…al issue was Jerusalem. I had stretched our negotiating position almost to breaking point. The “pocket” ideas Arafat ended up rejecting challenged a longstanding Israeli political taboo. In practical terms, they amounted to a breach of the...
t Arafat once more, in a joint session with President Clinton, but only for closing statements. The President and I spoke as much in sorrow and frustration as anger. Both of us said we thought an historic agreement had been within our grasp...
…Ben-Ami and Yossi Ginossar, also said they thought it was a good idea. It was they who’d pressed me to go see Arafat for tea and sweets earlier in the summit. But that meeting had produced not even a glimmer of negotiating flexibility from...
…r out in her efforts to find at least some, informal, way of moving the summit along in Clinton’s absence. If Arafat had failed to show even a scintilla of movement with the President in the room, I knew there was no way that he was going t...
Arafat our explicit understanding that, with the exception of the talks on the holy sites, nothing would happen until he accepted the concessions that President Clinton and I had delivered as at least a basis for further negotiations. As a...
…iscussions would be held until and unless a way ahead on the Temple Mount was found. If that happened, and if Arafat finally accepted the “pocket” proposals as an agreed starting point, formal negotiations could resume. Clinton accepted thi...
…etting a bite to eat in the dining room in Laurel Lodge when Madeleine showed up. She didn’t bother defending Arafat. She was as frustrated as I was. Her message was that after the summit, it was important not to make things worse. A negoti...
…ce necessarily, but agreement to treat the proposals as a basis for negotiating an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Arafat’s answer came shortly before dawn. It was “no”. Clinton couldn’t quite believe it. He went back to see Arafat, telling him...
…t had the makings of a potential breakthrough toward a fair and final peace. I told him I hoped so. But given Arafat’s behavior so far, I had my doubts. Now, it was our turn to wait. The President invited Arafat to Aspen and, from what we h...
…ment, looked all but impossible. Even Shlomo’s and Gili’s freelancing had produced only a series of no’s from Arafat. But I felt I couldn’t give up. Much as I’d been resisting it, I believed I needed to give Clinton my true bottom lines, ev...
well as the Muslim Quarter of the Old City and a “custodial role” over the holy sites. But Arafat said no. He insisted on Palestinian sovereignty over all of East Jerusalem, including the Old City and the holy sites. For a few hours after C...
d make a genuine attempt to get an agreement. “I can’t see any change in Arafat’s pattern. We take all the risks.” I said I doubted that Arafat expected to hear that we had decided to “give him Jerusalem.” In any case, the Israeli public ha...
tinian sovereignty. “You keep us, and Arafat, waiting for 13 hours,” Clinton fumed, his face nearly scarlet. “And you want me to present something less than you’ve already offered.” He said he wouldn’t do it. “This is not real. It’s not ser...
