Every indexed document

the signal represents France or the United States’s

players will learn not to attack when they estimate 100

000 was chosen arbitrarily) there is no Nash equilibrium in

but instead receive some imperfect signal (e.g.

we assume that players do not directly observe the

which means Assad is equally likely to kill any number of

” 2013). We say that the norm against chemical

but 25 % supported intervention if the Syrian government

as in DeScioli and Kurzban’s ( 2009 ) Side-Taking Game. The above

suppose we observe Israel killing civilians

we would not expect much of an omission–commission

and those who cooperate without considering the prospect of reciprocation

let’s again consider dwarf tossing. Many see it as

never simply as a means but always at the same time as

this model may help explain why ideologues that are

we trust candidates for political office whose policies are

and the benefits from this trust outweigh the risk of

or if they were “authentic” altruists who did good without anticipating

cooperative interaction to player 1; and bp + d (1 − p ) is the expected payoff to

respectively; p is the likelihood of the low temptation; a /(1 − w ) is the