it is important to examine whether those purposes
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it may be extremely difficult for victims to
as both Bush and Obama Administration spokesmen have insisted
Iran would almost certainly remain a major player in its region. Its adjustment to the war and its outcome would have a major role in shaping regional realities. A beaten
an outcome that seems scarcely conceivable
we cannot rule out the harmful protraction of a war. Every war has to end
how might we expect its leaders to go about it? At least three types of escalation are open to Tehran: horizontal
especially combined with those of its likely allies
although its offensive and defensive capabilities are much more limited than Hizballah’s. Hamas’s offensive capabilities rest on mortars and rockets of gradually increasing range
so it would have only a limited ability to directly assist Iran in a conflict with the United States. Syria’s missile systems could target military sites
and it can fire as many as 500–600 per day. Hizballah also has the ability to conduct terrorist or special operations against civilian
we are not “safe” from it anywhere. Missile systems (principally the Shahab 3 variants and Sejjl types) allow Iran to strike targets throughout the Middle East
let’s suppose that the war begins with a limited air and naval operation. Iran could respond in a limited “tit-for-tat” way. But the regime might conclude that the operation is intended to remove it from power (or succeed in doing so uninte...
it seems to follow that if the United States chose to attack Iran
the United States or a U.S.-led coalition must plan for all four levels of war and organize itself to ensure unity of command and purpose across those levels. It will
Washington would find it difficult to keep Israel out—as it did during the 1991 Gulf War. That would complicate the U.S. ability to manage its coalition
based on the evolution of Turkish politics) in addition to some Persian Gulf states
both willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments
short duration strike largely limited to nuclear facilities. It would aim to inflict serious damage
the presumed initiators of war in this case