meant that Turkey, controlling the Bosporus, had to be kept in the
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meant that Turkey, controlling the Bosporus, had to be kept in the
American bloc. Syria and Iraq shifted policies in the late 1950s and
by the mid-1960s had been armed by the Soviets. This made Turkey's
position precarious: If the Soviets pressed from the north while Syria
and Iraq pressed from the south, the outcome would be uncertain, to
say the least, and the global balance of power was at stake.
The United States used Iran to divert Iraq's attention. Israel was
equally useful in diverting Syria's attention. So long as Israel
threatened Syria from the south, it could not divert its forces to the
north. That helped secure Turkey at a relatively low cost in aid and
risk. By aligning itself with the interests of a great power, Israel lost
some of its room for maneuver: For example, in 1973, it was limited
by the United States in what it could do to Egypt. But those
limitations aside, it remained autonomous internally and generally
free to pursue its strategic interests.
The end of hostilities with Egypt, guaranteed by the Sinai buffer
zone, created a new era for Israel. Egypt was restored to its traditional
position, Jordan was a marginal power on the east bank, Lebanon was
in its normal, unstable mode, and only Syria was a threat. However, it
was a threat that Israel could easily deal with. Syria by itself could
not threaten the survival of Israel.
Following Camp David (an ironic name), Israel was in its Davidic
model, in a somewhat modified sense. Its survival was not at stake.
Its problems — the domination of a large, hostile population and
managing events in the northern Levant — were subcritical (meaning
that, though these were not easy tasks, they did not represent
fundamental threats to national survival, so long as Israel retained
national unity). When unified, Israel has never been threatened by its
neighbors. Geography dictates against it.
Israel's danger will come only if a great power seeks to dominate the
Mediterranean Basin or to occupy the region between Afghanistan
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031873
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