With negotiations frozen, the Palestinians turned to unilateral
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With negotiations frozen, the Palestinians turned to unilateral
measures: seeking a United Nations vote admitting the State of
Palestine to membership and getting dozens of countries to recognize
a Palestinian state. Meanwhile, their delegitimization campaign
against Israel continued apace, especially in Europe, where calls for
boycotts and sanctions spread. On the pro-Israel side there was also
consideration of unilateral measures—steps to head off the
Palestinians diplomatically (several of which I described and
supported in the April 11 Weekly Standard).
Some forlorn hope may still have existed inside the administration
that a compromise on construction could bring the Palestinians back
to the table with the government of Israel—auntil the agreement
between Hamas and Fatah was signed on April 27. This agreement,
unless and until it collapses, makes Israeli concessions or new
flexibility in the West Bank impossible and puts paid to the entire
“peace process.” It brings Hamas into the Palestinian Authority
government, ending a period of several years when Palestinian
Security Forces have cooperated with the Israel Defense Forces
against terrorism and against Hamas in particular. It will also bring
Hamas—next year and for the first time—ainto the PLO, the body
charged with negotiating peace with Israel. Even Yasser Arafat
resisted that development when he headed the PLO, and it seems
obvious that Israel cannot negotiate peace with an anti-Semitic
terrorist group bent on its destruction.
So where can the White House turn if it wants some kind of peace
process in the Middle East? Syria. After all, in his first term as prime
minister, back in 1998, Benjamin Netanyahu did authorize indirect
negotiations with Syria. And the [DF—and especially Ehud Barak, a
former head of the IDF, Israel’s defense minister, and a close adviser
to Netanyahu—has long favored such a deal. The IDF theory was that
if Syria made peace, so would Lebanon, and then Israel would be at
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031836
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