The council would have a president, or secretary general, an entire
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The council would have a president, or secretary general, an entire
staff and premises allocated by the Iraqi government in Baghdad. The
council will also have its own budget, which is yet to be determined
but will equal that of the premiership, the parliamentary speaker and
the presidency. Allawi will reportedly be entitled to approximately
100 advisers and two military units to protect him and the council
from terrorist operations.
Because of so much deliberate delay, Allawi recently announced that
he was no longer interested in the offer, and that he too would back
out on his agreement with Maliki and call for early elections.
If that happens, there is no telling what kind of vacuum will emerge
in [Iraq and who will fill it, especially as Arab countries have too
much on their plate at this stage to focus on Iraq.
Theoretically, with Saudi Arabia focused on the situation in Bahrain
and Syria occupied by internal problems, the only country willing
and able to do the job is Iran. All eyes are now focused on Iraqi
Kurdistan President Masoud al-Barazani, who has said he will launch
a new initiative to bridge the gap between Maliki and Allawi.
A 15-man committee has been formed to conduct shuttle diplomacy
between the two leaders, under the auspices of Barazani, and to date
they have made no contacts with any of the Arab countries
neighboring Iraq, or with the Iranians. Last October, Barazani's name
graced a deal, known as the Irbil Agreement, where all parties agreed
to form a national partnership government. Under the agreement,
Maliki and President Jalal Talabani would retain their posts, while
Allawi would get to chair the NCSP.
The real problem facing Iraq today, and explaining Maliki's delay, is
fear of what the NCSP will mean for Iraq once both Maliki and
Allawi are out of office. The November agreement did not state
whether the council would permanently be under the control of
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