the United States could attempt to convince non-Hamas elements in

2] the United States could attempt to convince non-Hamas elements in the PA to use and disseminate U.S. funds without any knowledge or participation of Hamas. Yet such a plan may not withstand legal scrutiny. If non-Hamas PA officials failed to honor the agreement and Hamas gained access to U.S. funds, prosecutors might one day argue that the persons who made the donation knew that such a result was likely and disregarded the risk. Such “willful blindness” could serve as the basis of a criminal prosecution. Or, the whole government may turn out to be Hamas-affiliated, rendering any such distinction meaningless. The Obama administration could also instruct OFAC to grant specific exemptions so that the United States could fund particular entities within the PA. OFAC followed this strategy in 2006, announcing at the time that “consistent with current foreign policy” it was “authorizing U.S. persons to engage in certain transactions in which the PA may have an interest.” Mirroring some of the exceptions listed under PATA, OFAC exempted transactions with the Palestinian judiciary, non-Hamas members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and various entities controlled by Abbas. Although the United States sought to continue supporting non-Hamas elements of the PA in 2006, it is doubtful that OFAC could repeat the same tactic now, thanks to the relationship between Fatah and Hamas. In 2006, Hamas campaigned against Fatah and tensions between the two camps remained strong after the election. Armed conflict broke out the following year despite the creation of a de facto unity government, splintering the PA. Should the current reconciliation agreement come to fruition, however, it would create a joint power-sharing government. As a result, it may be more difficult for OFAC to justify special exemptions on the grounds that certain entities within the PA are insulated from Hamas; by all appearances, they will be intertwined. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030182