American policymakers may counter that
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American policymakers may counter that
Iran would never be foolish enough to
threaten or use nuclear weapons against
the United States, given its robust nuclear
deterrence posture. But the threat or use
of nuclear weapons might not look so
foolish from Iran's perspective. One of
the great strategic lessons drawn from the
long history of conflict in the Middle East
is this: Do not go to war without nuclear
weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when
he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do
not allow the United States to
methodically build-up forces in the Gulf
prior to invading, as Saddam did both in
the run-up to the 1991 re-conquest of
Kuwait and in 2003, before the drive to
topple the regime in Baghdad.
Drawing upon these lessons, Iran will
likely do everything in its power to deny
the United States the ability to surge
conventional forces into the region -- and
that might include threatening to target
U.S. forces with nuclear weapons. Iran
might accept the risk that preemptive use
of nuclear weapons could bring on
American nuclear retaliation, because
failure to do so would mean certain
destruction for the regime. The United
States would be able to build-up
conventional forces in the region and oust
Iran's leaders just as it did in Baghdad.
This line of strategic reasoning runs
counter to conventional wisdom in the
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