with the most obvious absence being that of the Muslim Brotherhood, which protested what it consider

with the most obvious absence being that of the Muslim Brotherhood, which protested what it considered to be a biased ballot. It remains unclear who will succeed Prime Minister Abdullah Ensur (who submitted his resignation to King Abdullah on January 29"), although analysts and commentators consider it likely that a number of unexpected appointments will be made in an effort to address the growing malaise. Media reports speculate that there are also plans to set up an official channel for communication with the Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile, it appears that King Abdullah is seeking to bolster ties with regional allies, perhaps for both political and economic Teens: the King made visits to Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait from January 29" to February 4. Syria: Israeli warplanes are generally believed to have struck a convoy en route to Lebanon on January 30", although this has not been confirmed by the government of Israel. The convoy was reported to have been carrying sophisticated antiaircraft weaponry to Hezbollah. The attack—carried out on the outskirts of Damascus—was met by a sharp threat of retaliation from both the Syrian and Iranian governments: a significant indicator of the regional reverberations of the Syrian civil war and the general volatility permeating the region. Despite the lack of progress of an international peace initiative spearheaded by Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, a new plan by Syrian opposition leader Moaz al-Khatib—comprising a dialogue with President al-Assad based on the principle of the regime’s departure—offers a glimmer of hope. Upon meeting with al-Khatib on February 3" the foreign ministers of Iran and Russia (the closest allies of the al-Assad regime) seem to have agreed to help facilitate this process—an interesting turn of events. The new plan comes as the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, although some help is foreseen from the $1.5 billion in pledges made at a donors’ conference on January 30° in Kuwait. Israel: While recent elections kept Netanyahu’s Likud party in the lead by winning 31 of 120 seats in the Knesset, the new centrist party Yesh Atid’s ability to win 19 seats under the leadership of Yair Lapid garnered all the attention. The results generated media debate about the possibility of a shift in Israeli policy vis-a-vis the Palestinians. In fact, the election campaign and its results were centered on domestic and socioeconomic issues, and internal reform. Furthermore, Yesh Atid is known to maintain an ambiguous stance on the peace process. On January 29", Israel became the first country to boycott a United Nations review of its human rights practices, despite the United States’ and other political players’ advice to participate. This is a breach of an established practice of cooperation and thus represents precedence for noncooperation by other states. It also leaves the question of human rights in occupied Palestinian territories outside the jurisdiction of the international community. It remains unclear, however, whether the newly elected government will make a pragmatic effort to reengage with the UN review effort. Bahrain: On January 21‘' King Hamad al-Khalifa issued a decree endorsing a renewed national dialogue. Subsequently, on February 4", Minister of Justice Khalid bin Ali al-Khalifa announced that the national dialogue would resume on February 10". Press reports indicate willingness by the opposition’s to participate in the dialogue. Iran: President Ahmadinejad was warmly welcomed by President Morsi upon arrival in Cairo on February 5" and, interestingly, by the Sunni leadership of Al-Azhar. The Iranian leader reciprocated by offering to provide Egypt with a “big credit line” to help its lagging economy, a telling indication of Tehran’s desire for a rapprochement. The reaction on the Egyptian street, however, was generally negative, revealing thedisconnect between a dominant Muslim Brotherhood political elite reaching out to an Islamist power and a critical faction of Egyptian society hostile to this shift. The meeting is not necessarily an indicator that bilateral ties will improve, HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029690