regime does in fact survive, Iran would become increasingly emboldened
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regime does in fact survive, Iran would become increasingly emboldened,
with potentially disastrous consequences for the United States and its
allies and interests in the Middle East.
Denuding U.S. forces in the region to enable a pivot to Asia 1s also risky.
Nowhere else in the world is America more likely to deploy forces than in
the Persian Gulf in opposition to Iran, and nowhere else is it of utmost
importance that any potential confrontation be won decisively in the next
five to ten years than with the Islamic Republic.
Going forward, Washington must discriminate between Iranian behaviors
it considers unacceptable -- such as support for terrorism, hegemonic
ambitions, and progress toward nuclear weapons -- and those it can
tolerate. U.S. officials could open the door for negotiations by making
clear to Tehran that they do not seek regime change; the first step in that
regard would be to let Iran know that Washington respects it as a nation-
state and not a transnational revolutionary movement.
Finally, disorganization within the U.S. government and a "go it alone"
mentality have accounted for many of Washington's internal difficulties in
responding to the Iranian challenge. To alleviate this problem, all cabinet-
level officials must be in constant and complete coordination, devoid of
routine bureaucratic obstacles. In addition, the appointment of a senior
subcabinet official whose sole responsibility is Iran (or, alternatively, a
small group of officials in constant coordination) could allow the
administration to reorganize bureaucratically in preparation for this year of
decision.
THOMAS PICKERING
Discussions of containment policy typically imply accepting the Islamic
Republic as an inevitable nuclear power and using deterrence to deal with
a nuclear-armed Iran. Yet such an outcome would be disastrous for U.S.
nonproliferation policy, which is based on the notion that fewer nuclear
states means less chance of miscalculated use. If Iran attains a nuclear
weapon, other regional powers would likely follow suit -- clearly an
undesirable outcome for the international community.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028656
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