BREYER, J., dissenting

6 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. BREYER, J., dissenting statute’s basic purposes,” ibid., as well as “‘the history of the times when it was passed,” Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669 (1979) (quoting United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79 1875)). In this case, historical context, purpose, and related consequences tell us a great deal about the proper interpretation of the Immunities Act. Congressional reports explain that Congress, acting in the immediate aftermath of World War II, intended the Immunities Act to serve two related purposes. First, it would “enabl[e] this country to fulfill its commitments in connection with its membership in international organiza- tions.” S. Rep. No. 861, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1945); see also id., at 2-8 (explaining that the Immunities Act was “basic legislation” expected to “satisfy in full the require- ments of... international organizations conducting activi- ties in the United States”); H.R. Rep. No. 1208, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1945) (similar). And second, it would “facilitate fully the functioning of international organiza- tions in this country.” S. Rep. No. 861, at 3. A I first examine the international commitments that Congress sought to fulfill. By 1945, the United States had entered into agreements creating several important multi- lateral organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAQ). See id., at 2. The founding agreements for several of these organiza- tions required member states to grant them broad immun- ity from suit. The Bretton Woods Agreements, for exam- ple, provided that the IMF “shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that. it expressly waives its immunity.” Articles of Agreement of HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028564