the heads of military intelligence and Mossad, to sign off on the operational

/ BARAK / 133 the heads of military intelligence and Mossad, to sign off on the operational viability of the plan. That was what now ended any prospect of military action, at least for a few months. Bibi, Lieberman and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the full cabinet. But we asked each of them for their views on the operation. We knew they had political reservations, along the lines of those voiced by Dan Meridor. On an issue of this magnitude, it was accepted practice that military and intelligence commanders could weigh in on the political implications as well. But their formal role was operational and professional. Ashkenazi and the other generals did concede that in every area — planning, materiel, training and intelligence — our attack plan was far ahead of where it had been a year earlier. Yet Ashkenazi, in particular, concluded that the preparations had not yet “crossed the threshold of operational capability”. I was furious. I respected the considered opposition of ministers like Dan or Benny Begin. I had no problem with the chief-of-staff or other generals expressing similar views on the political or geo-strategic implications of an Israeli attack, even though our intelligence assessments suggested the concerns were almost certainly unfounded. Yet what I found astonishing was Ashkenazi’s suggestion that the “operational threshold” had not been crossed. Yes, this would be a demanding mission. It was not without risks. No operation was. But having followed every stage and detail of the preparations — and as a former chief of staff and intelligence chief myself — I believed it was simply wrong on a professional level to say that we lacked the capacity, and a workable plan, for a military strike if the order was given. Ashkenazi’s objection did mean there was no way we were going to attack at least until well into the new year. Our discussions would continue, as would our refinement and strengthening of the attack plan. So would Iran’s progress toward its “zone of immunity,” which we now believed would begin late in 2012, a couple of years away. As that point drew closer, we’d face an ever-more-pressing need to decide finally whether military action was necessary. 419 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028267