Document

reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all

Ref IMAGES-009-HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028251.txt Release House Oversight Committee — Epstein Estate Records (Nov 2025) 1 pages

Epstein Suite indexes the text; the original document lives at its official source. We don't host the original file — view it on the official release to read it in full.

View the original on the official release

People & organizations named in this document

Being named here is not an accusation of wrongdoing.

Document text

Text is machine OCR and may contain errors. Confirm against the original source above.

/ BARAK / 117 reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all possible measures to prevent Syria from getting a nuclear weapon. An immutable, core assumption in Israel’s security strategy was the need to retain our ability to deter, and if necessary defeat, our enemies. A nuclear Syria — or Iraq, or Iran — would dramatically alter the balance of power in the region, at obvious risk to Israel. Syria posed a particular threat, as part of an increasingly close alliance with Iran, and with Hizbollah in Lebanon. The question, however, was how and when to strike the reactor. Olmert wanted to attack within days. He seemed to assume that, as a former chief of staff, ’'d nod enthusiastically and go along with him. I did understand the reasons for his sense of urgency. Not only did we have to make sure we attacked before the fuel was on site. There was always the risk the Syrians would find out that we were aware of their nuclear facility, putting them on even higher alert. But the operational challenge was complex. We need a fail-safe plan to destroy the reactor. We had to do it in such a way as to avoid a full-scale military confrontation with Syria if possible. And we had to ensure we were ready for that, if it did happen. It took very little time for me to realize that none of those prerequisites was yet in place. Not unlike the recent Lebanon war, we were choosing between two off-the-shelf plans from the kirya. One involved using a large military force, and would almost certainly draw us into a major conflict with Syria. The other was a smaller, targeted operation. But it remained untested, and there was no certainty it would actually destroy the reactor. Over the next few months, Olmert got more and more frustrated with the fact we hadn’t yet attacked, and frustrated with me as well. We held dozens of meetings, sometimes two or three a day, chaired by the Prime Minister, sometimes by me as Defense Minister, or by the chief of staff or service commanders. Invariably, I began my remarks by saying: “We have to destroy the reactor.” This was not because I felt that any of us seriously doubted that. It was because Olmert was beginning to suggest to the few ministers and senior officers aware of our planning that I was against attacking the reactor. In fact, I was working with the military and Mossad to ensure we had a plan that would succeed, with the minimum possible risk of drawing us into a major clash with the Syrians after the facility was destroyed. I was also working — with the help of the Americans — to make sure we could get the forces and munitions in place in the north of Israel to 403 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028251

Have a question about what this document contains?

Ask the documents