year before. “We signed a three-phase contract with Arafat,” I said. “Try to
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year before. “We signed a three-phase contract with Arafat,” I said. “Try to
imagine one of you selling me three pieces of property. If I fail to pay for the
first one on time, you might not immediately cancel the contract. You might
even be ready to help me collect the necessary money. But you would never
proceed to deliver the second property before I paid for the first one, unless you
were a fool.” I also warned of longer-term dangers: “terrorism, radical Islamic
fundamentalism, the proliferation of surface-to-surface missiles and weapons of
mass destruction, and threats to the long-term stability of the more pragmatic
Arab regimes.” I singled out Iran, because it was determined to export its brand
of fundamentalism Islam, sponsor terror and develop a nuclear weapon.
I also accompanied CSIS colleagues on speaking engagements to other
American cities. I was about to board a flight to Seattle in April when I got a
message saying Rabin wanted to talk to me. After we took off, I used the on-
board phone facility and, with a swipe of a credit card, was soon on the line to
the Prime Minister. Since the exchange was in Hebrew, I’m fairly sure anyone
overhearing me had no idea what we were talking about. “I need you to come
back as soon as possible,” Rabin said. I already knew, from Giora, that he was
anxious to find a long-term replacement as Minister of Interior. The leading
light in the Sephardi religious party Shas, Arye Deri, had had to leave the post
under allegations of bribe-taking. After Rabin had taken on the portfolio himself
four 18 months, he had placed Labor’s Uzi Baram there, but only as a
temporary arrangement. I didn’t feel I could refuse outright. But I reminded him
that under army rules, “as soon as possible” still meant another 100 days. And
ideally, I said I wanted to finish the best part of a year in Washington. I asked
whether it would be possible to join the cabinet in the middle of November
instead. “What difference will a few more months make?”
Rabin said he needed me now, and that mid-November would be too late.
“Ehud, in politics, you can never predict what will happen by then.” Neither of
us could have known how terribly prophetic his words would turn out to be.
I was not only new to cabinet politics. I wasn’t even a member of the
Knesset. But in addition to naming me as head of a major ministry — in charge
of everything from citizenship and immigration to planning, zoning, and the
funding of local government — Rabin made me a member of his “inner cabinet”
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