could see that a similar myopia, or denial, was affecting the armored corps. On
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could see that a similar myopia, or denial, was affecting the armored corps. On
patrol along the canal, I would sometimes see the hulk of an Israeli tank which
had been destroyed by Soviet-made AT-3s. Known as Saggers, they were
portable, allowing a single soldier to fire wire-guided missiles. Their range was
nearly a mile-and-a-half, which was more than the main guns on our tanks. Yet
no one appeared to have addressed the question of what would happen if the
Egyptians used Saggers on an even greater scale in a future war.
I remained in the Sinai through early 1971, but never led my tank company
on combat operations. By the time we were due for our deployment, the War of
Attrition was suddenly over. Neither we nor the Egyptians wanted a return to
full-scale war. With Washington taking the lead, a cease-fire was agreed. Both
sides claimed victory. But both were exhausted. Certainly, most Israelis had
ceased to see a compelling reason for the 1,000 days of fighting. We had lost
about 900 dead: more than in the Six-Day War.
But in one respect, the Egyptians won. Under the terms of the truce, their
anti-aircraft batteries were barred from a roughly 30-mile strip along the canal.
Within days of the truce, however, Nasser began moving his SAM batteries
forward. Before long, there were nearly 100 missile sites in the “prohibited”
zone, giving the Egyptians control of 20 miles or more of the airspace on our
side of the canal. Golda was incensed. So was Bar-Lev. But there was no way,
and no will, to reopen the fighting and force Nasser to move the missiles back.
The cease-fire took effect at midnight on August 7, 1970. I’ve never had
trouble recalling the date, because of a phone call almost exactly 24 hours later.
It was from my mother-in-law, to tell me Nava had gone into labor with our first
child. Since I was due for deployment on the front line, we had agreed weeks
earlier that the best thing would be for her to have the baby in Tiberias, so her
parents could be with her. Now, I got a Jeep and raced north. I reached Tiberias
the next morning. I opened the door to the hospital room and saw Nava,
obviously tired but beaming, cradling our daughter Michal in her arms.
I managed to stay with them for several days before returning to the Sinai.
With Nava and Michal soon settled back into our apartment in the north Tel
Aviv neighborhood of Ramat Aviv, I made weekend visits home whenever I
could. Still, I saw nowhere near as much of our daughter’s first few months as
most fathers. As Nava and I would discover even more jarringly over the next
few years, that was an inescapable part of being an army officer.
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