Document

They say that you can read a person’s feelings on his face. But if so, either

Ref IMAGES-009-HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027849.txt Release House Oversight Committee — Epstein Estate Records (Nov 2025) 1 pages

Epstein Suite indexes the text; the original document lives at its official source. We don't host the original file — view it on the official release to read it in full.

View the original on the official release

Document text

Text is machine OCR and may contain errors. Confirm against the original source above.

Night Flight They say that you can read a person’s feelings on his face. But if so, either I’m a very good actor — the opposite of what anyone who has worked closely with me would tell you — or the journalists clustered in front of me weren’t very good face-readers. They said that I looked defeated. Distressed. Depressed. Yet as I delivered my brief final statement outside an olive-green cabin at Camp David, the American presidential retreat in the forested Catoctin hills north of Washington, I felt none of those things. Yes, I was disappointed. I realised that what had happened over the last 14 days, or more crucially what had not happened, was bound to have serious consequences, both for me personally, as Prime Minister of Israel, and for my country. But I had been a politician, at that point, for all of five years. By far most of my life, I had spent in uniform. As a teenager, small and slight and not even shaving yet, I was one of the founding core of a unit called Sayveret Matkal, Israel’s equivalent of America’s Delta Force, or Britain’s SAS. It may be that the way I thought and acted, the way I dealt with danger or with crises, came from someplace inside me. Even as a young kid, I was always quiet, serious, contemplative. But my 13 years as a part of Israel’s main special-forces unit, especially once I became its commander, etched those qualities more deeply. And they added new ones: a sense that you could never plan a mission too carefully or prepare too assiduously; an understanding that what you thought, and certainly what you said, mattered a lot less than what you did. And above all the realisation that, when one of our nighttime commando operations was over, whether it had succeeded or failed, you had to take a step back. Evaluate things accurately, coolly, without illusions. Then, in the light of how the situation had changed, you had to decide how best to move forward. That approach, to the occasional frustration of the politicians and diplomats working alongside me during this critical stage of Israel’s history, had guided me from the moment I became Prime Minister. In my very first discussions with President Clinton a year earlier — a long weekend, beginning at the White House and moving on to Camp David — I had mapped out at great length, in great detail, every one of the steps I knew we would have to take to confront the central issue facing Israel: the need for peace. 1 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027849

Have a question about what this document contains?

Ask the documents