and heart rate [27], and sometimes blushing or stammering [28]. In contrast to the Social
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and heart rate [27], and sometimes blushing or stammering [28]. In contrast to the Social
Heuristics Hypothesis, our model also predicts that decisions related to cooperation are
more likely to be intuitive than other decisions that are similarly usually worthwhile, and
that intuitive cooperators are trusted more than reflective cooperators. To our knowledge,
neither of these predictions has been tested yet.
People dislike considering trade-offs related to “sacred values” [29]. Sacred values
are values such as love, liberty, honor, justice, or life, that people treat “as possessing
transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any mingling
with secular values” [29]. While there is variation in what societies consider sacred,
virtually all societies have a concept of sacredness [29]. Sacred values are so strongly
imbued in us that we do not find them puzzling prima fascia, yet their existence and
origin remains poorly understood. What makes us treat some values as sacred and what
differentiates these values from secular values like free time or money that we more readily
trade off?
Our model provides one possible explanation. People who calculate costs of trading
off against sacred values are less trustworthy when it comes to safeguarding these values
than people who consider them sacred and would never calculate the costs of trading
off against them. Responding with disgust to these “taboo trade-offs” may be one way
to prevent us from interacting with people who make such trade offs and hence are less
trustworthy, and may also be a way to signal to others that we ourselves would not
consider, and therefore make, such trade-offs. Consistent with CWOL, it is taboo to
consider the trade-off even if one ultimately makes the right choice, and the longer the
trade-off is considered for, the harsher the judgement by observers [29]. As with intuitive
cooperation, if people who refuse to consider taboo trade-offs are seen as more trustworthy,
this may lead people to evolve or learn to abide by these taboos. If CWOL indeed underlies
iim
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