“When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” However, if policies
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“When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” However, if policies
based on conviction or consistency over time are signals that a candidate does not look
at the benefits of cooperation, this is an indication that the candidate can be trusted in
situations where making the decision that is right for his or her constituency comes at
a large political cost. Consistent with this, opponents take every opportunity to paint
candidates as flip-floppers who cannot be trusted [21]. This argument generalizes outside
of politics to why we respect people who are “principled” over those who are “strategic”.
People intuitively cooperate. That is, when people make decisions rapidly, they are
more likely to cooperate than if they have time to deliberate. Additionally, people who
cooperate make quicker decisions than those who defect [22]. The Social Heuristics Hy-
pothesis offers one explanation for this phenomena: we adopt heuristics to avoid incurring
cognitive costs associated with deliberation [23, 24, 25]. In a world with repeated inter-
actions, it is usually worthwhile to cooperate, so individuals may adopt heuristics such
as “always cooperate” or “cooperate as long a situation is not a business interaction.”
These same individuals, when serving as laboratory subjects, may apply these heuristics
and cooperate even when it is not worthwhile to do so [22, 26].
Our model offers the following alternative explanation for intuitive cooperation. Intu-
itive cooperation may serve to reduce responsiveness to realized costs. Thus, others should
trust intuitive cooperators more than deliberate cooperators. Since intuitive cooperators
are more trustworthy, this may lead people to evolve or learn to become intuitive cooper-
ators. Note that this explanation suggests that intuitive cooperation may be an optimal
response to others’ ability to detect deliberation, and not, as a heuristic is, an attempt
to avoid cognitive costs. For this explanation to be sensible, it must be the case that
whether or not a decision is made intuitively or deliberatively is detectable. In fact, it is:
deliberative decision making leads to slower reaction time, as well as increased pupil size
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