In addition to “setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons,”
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In addition to “setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons,”
the 2007 statement argued for a number of practical measures to
diminish the likelihood that nuclear weapons would fall into
“dangerous hands,” or that they would be launched by accident, or
that countries interested in, but not now possessing, such weapons
would succeed in acquiring them. A number of these measures are
doable and desirable, but some are dubious. Altering the posture of
nuclear weapons now deployed so that they need not be launched
urgently, thereby increasing warning time and diminishing the danger
of an accidental or unauthorized launch, would be a useful thing to
do—although there is room for debate about how best to accomplish
this. The end of the Cold War should have brought an end to
deterrent forces poised for instantaneous launch (which in the
extreme case could mean launching missiles on the strength of radar
warnings) but, unfortunately and dangerously, old habits die hard.
Reducing or eliminating the number of short-range nuclear weapons
that are designed to be forward deployed would also be useful, since
these are the small, highly mobile weapons that could fall into the
wrong hands far more readily than large, central strategic systems that
are carefully controlled. Most of the short-range weapons deployed
today are Russian, however, and the Russians have resisted American
proposals to adopt limits on their number. (Given Russia’s strong
interest in limiting strategic weapons, it is difficult to understand why
the Obama administration did not insist on some limits on short-
range nuclear weapons as a condition for the New START Treaty.
Unused leverage is a squandered opportunity.)
“Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of
weapons, weapons-useable plutonium and highly enriched uranium
everywhere in the world,” another of the 2007 statement’s
recommendations, is an obvious thing to do. But there is an
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