The Crooked Course Xxxix

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi The Crooked Course Xxxix conceded that only the United Nations, and not Israel alone, could delineate on a map and demarcate on the ground the line of withdrawal. Such a line had to be, to the best of the United Nations’ knowledge, in conformity with Lebanon’s international boundar- ies. On this basis, and with the consent of the parties, the UN Secretary-General could then report to the Security Council and eventually recommend that it should confirm that Israel had ended its occupation. This understanding led to an agreement for the United Nations to negotiate with the Governments of Lebanon, Syria and Israel. Through intense, difficult, and stormy tripartite negotiations over five months, the UN Secretary-General was in May 2000 able to report to the Security Council that the UN had reached an agreement with Israel, Syria, and Lebanon on a line of withdrawal (the so-called Blue Line). On this basis, it was determined that Israeli troops had left all Lebanese territory. Further, he reported that, consistent with UN requirements, Israel’s Lebanese proxy, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), had been disarmed and disbanded. Subsequently, the UN Security Council confirmed the end of Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon in fulfillment of Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 of 1978. In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1559. Secretary- General Kofi Annan appointed me as his special envoy for its implementation. In a nutshell the resolution called for respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; the disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non- Lebanese militias; and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. After Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the only remaining foreign troops were Syrian. Immediately after the resolution was adopted, I engaged in intense negotiations with President Assad, who until the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on 14 February 2005, was consistently resistant to move on the issue. On 12 March 2005, I was airborne with a small UN team, among them Fabrice Aidan, on my way to Damascus for a new round of talks with the President. Midway, the captain informed me that he was requested to change course and land in Aleppo. Afterwards I was told that the reason was to avoid the media who were waiting for the arrival of the UN team in Damascus. I was picked up at Aleppo airport by Walid Muallem, who was then Deputy Foreign Minister. He brought me to Assad’s villa, where a few hours of negotiations resulted in the Aleppo understanding, which outlined Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon with specific timelines. Assad honored his word, and ended twenty-nine years of Syrian military presence in Lebanon consistent with Resolution 1559. What is often forgotten in the recurrent doom and gloom in the Middle East, is that the step-by-step approach, which started with the Camp David Accords of 1978, has for more than thirty years led to conflict resolution: peace between Israel and Egypt; the Oslo Accords; the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO; the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank, which still functions with its presidency, cabinet, and ministries; peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994, with the recognition of borders and a long-lasting security cooperation; Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000; and the subsequent Syrian military withdrawal five years later; as well as Israel’s pull out from the Gaza Strip. All these steps would have been difficult, if not impossible, without the previous ones. In 2000 the attempts to put a final end to the Syrian-Israeli and the Palestinian— Israeli conflicts both failed. This exposes the risks of a totalist approach to solving such HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023171