nonhuman phenomena. In this way
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nonhuman phenomena. In this way,
anthropomorphic language incorporates
human society in a web of ethical
obligations that connect to the natural
environment and, by imaginative
extension, to the universe as a whole.
Although the drive toward social
connection is a general human trait,
however, persons neither seek nor find
satisfaction in a generalized sense of
connection. Instead, satisfying social
connections are sought and experienced
in terms of the social norms and values
of particular historical and cultural
settings. Likewise, anthropomorphism,
as an inferred social connection to the
nonhuman, takes shape and becomes
persuasive in terms of historically and
culturally specific assumptions about
society and social relations. This
chapter will, therefore, step back from
“Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,”
in order to describe how contemporary
scholarship in social neuroscience and in
the history of religions provides a fresh
point of view on the workings of
anthropomorphic perception and then
test that interpretive model by
reappraising Edwards’s famous sermon
in its historical context.
The Boundary of the Human
The line between the human and
the nonhuman is, perhaps, the most
consequential presupposition that any
society, group, or individual adopts
about life in the world. The way various
cultures draw this line, between “us” and
“the other,” has shaped civilizations and
their goals as well as the norms of
personal conduct and identity. Although
concepts of the human have a long and
contentious philosophical history, people
in their everyday lives show remarkable
consensus in the features they use to
define “human.” Central to this process
of perceiving the human is a perception
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of mind in other agents, including the
presence of goal-directed agency,
emotions such as anger, guilt, or pride, a
capacity for self-awareness, and free
will. As Nick Epley demonstrated in the
preceding chapter, the perception of
these distinctively human traits—“seeing
invisible minds”—1is a psychological
mechanism with tremendous influence
on the way humans order and understand
their social environment.
Mind perception is such a
powerful tool of inductive inference,
however, that it regularly crosses the line
it has itself drawn between the human
and the nonhuman. Scholars from a
wide array of disciplines have long
observed humans’ anthropomorphic
tendency to see nonhuman things or
events as humanlike, imbuing the real or
imagined behavior of nonhuman
phenomena with human motivations,
agency, and emotions. By perceiving
the world in terms of human capacities
and social relationships,
anthropomorphism builds a complex
system of analogies that uses knowledge
of what it is like to be a person, in order
to interpret the behavior of animals, the
function of technological devices, the
operation of complex social systems
such as “the market,” or natural
occurrences such as violent weather
patterns or catastrophic events.” Hence,
anthropomorphism, as a process of
inference that not only draws but also
crosses the line between the human and
the nonhuman, has very substantial
consequences for the human sense of
connection to nonhuman animals, to
larger ecological systems, and to the
structure of the universe taken as a
whole.
Contemporary psychological
research has created an intellectual space
that opens the phenomenon of
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_021350
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