principle of noninterference enshrined in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on
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principle of noninterference enshrined in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. It exposed beyond the possibility of concealment what China
really thinks of noninterference. The MCA president lost his seat.
This was not the only instance of insensitive behavior by Chinese diplomats in
Malaysia. In 2015, the previous Chinese ambassador saw fit to make his way to
Kuala Lumpur’s Chinatown, where only days previously the police had to use water
cannons to disperse a potentially violent anti-Chinese demonstration. There the
Chinese ambassador delivered a speech that, among other things, pronounced
the Chinese government’s opposition to any form of racial discrimination, adding
for good measure that it would be a shame if the peace of the area were to be
disrupted by the ill-intentioned and that Beijing would not stand idly by if anything
threatened the interests of its citizens and Malaysia-China relations.
Under other circumstances, these sentiments would perhaps have passed unnoticed.
But the timing and context laid the ambassador’s remarks open to disquieting
interpretations and drew a protest from the Malaysian government. The PRC foreign
ministry spokesman defended the ambassador’s action as “normal, friendly behavior.”
Undaunted, in another speech a day later, the Chinese ambassador said, “I would like
to stress once more, overseas huagiao and huaren, no matter where you go, no matter
how many generations you are, China is forever your warm national home.”
Such behavior is not atypical in Southeast Asia. If other Chinese diplomats have
behaved more prudently in their engagement of overseas Chinese communities in
other ASEAN countries, it seems a matter of differences between individuals rather
than policy. Since such behavior is patently not in China’s interest, China may be
beginning to believe its own propaganda. President Xi’s concentration of power and
insistence on greater party control seem to have created echo chambers where Chinese
diplomats and officials probably report only what is in accordance with preexisting
beliefs, resulting in situations where instructions are blindly given and followed.
This kind of behavior is not confined to countries where there are large overseas Chinese
communities. Cultural autism or insensitivity is one of the self-created obstacles to the
smooth implementation of the BRI that China is experiencing around the world. And as
the media report on the problems, awareness spreads. This does not mean that countries
will shun working with China. But countries are going to be increasingly cautious. They
will push back when the terms of engagement are too onerous and they will seek to forge
relationships with as many other major powers as possible.
Following the Malaysian elections, China is projecting friendliness toward Malaysia. But
as with Singapore, this is a pause, not the end of the story. Since influence operations are
Appendix 2
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020637
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