operations with espionage. In one instance, after a visit to China supported by CAIFC, an
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operations with espionage. In one instance, after a visit to China supported by CAIFC, an
American congressional official was asked by two employees at CAIFC who facilitated his
trip to host them during a return visit to Washington. He obliged, and they were seemingly
satisfied, having shopped extensively during their stay. Subsequently, the Chinese embassy
officers who had arranged the congressional official’s visit to China with CAIFC were
arrested and expelled for trying to steal US weapons technology, causing the US official to
end all contact with CAIFC.
Current Era
Tensions in US-China relations subsided after the terrorist attack on America in September
2001 and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq preoccupied the Bush administration
and Congress. Chinese and American leaders also proved to be sufficiently pragmatic to
reach common ground on advancing relations in mutually agreeable ways and managing
differences through a wide range of dialogues. Such exchanges only catalyzed visits by
more congressional members and staff delegations visits to China. At this time, members
often traveled to China in US government-—funded trips as guests of the US embassy. Some
member trips and very frequent staff delegation visits were authorized under provisions
of the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act (MECEA) that were in line with the
guidance of congressional ethics committees.’ In addition to the work of the US-Asia
Institute, those organizing and facilitating staff delegations grew to include the Aspen
Institute, the National Committee on US-China Relations, and the US-China Policy
Foundation.”
China also increased its own capacity to engage Congress beyond trips. Having moved into
a new embassy in Washington in 2009, the Chinese embassy increased its congressional
affairs staff to twelve (as of 2011), while also retaining the lobbying services of the firm
Patton Boggs.'! During his time as ambassador, Zhou Wenzhong boasted that he had visited
some one hundred members of Congress in their home districts. When certain measures,
such as a bill that would have penalized China for being a “currency manipulator,” came
before Congress, the embassy’s in-house team’s efforts reflected what some US officials
called a much more “nuanced” and “sophisticated” understanding of the body. Whether or
not Chinese officials or lobbyists interacting with congressional offices endeavored to exert
influence by means beyond persuasion—such as by offering material benefits or threatening
to withdraw Chinese investments or other tangible benefits to the congressional district—
remained hard to discern given the very limited public reporting on such matters.”
Congress, for its part, had already formalized efforts to better understand China through
a variety of working groups. By 2006, both the House and the Senate had formed a
US-China Inter-Parliamentary Exchange Group, which conducted periodic exchanges with
China’s National People’s Congress. Also showing stronger American interest in China at
that time were the Congressional China Caucus (led by members tending to be critical
Section 1
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020474
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