chairman Devin Nunes in a farcical effort to discredit Comey and support the wiretap
Epstein Suite indexes the text; the original document lives at its official source. We don't host the original file — view it on the official release to read it in full.
View the original on the official releasePeople & organizations named in this document
Being named here is not an accusation of wrongdoing.
Document text
Text is machine OCR and may contain errors. Confirm against the original source above.
chairman Devin Nunes in a farcical effort to discredit Comey and support the wiretap
theory. The scheme shortly collapsed in universal ridicule.
Bannon, taking a public hands-off with respect to both health care and Comey, began
to advise reporters that the important story wasn’t health care but Russia. This was cryptic
advice: it was not clear whether he was trying to distract attention from the coming health
care debacle, or couple it with this new dangerous variable, thus amping up the kind of
chaos that he usually benefited from.
But Bannon was unequivocal about one thing. As the Russia story unfolds, he advised
reporters, keep your eye on Kushner.
OOK Ok
By mid-March, Gary Cohn had been drafted into the effort to salvage the faltering health
care bill. This might have seemed like a form of hazing for Cohn, whose grasp of
legislative matters was even more limited than that of most in the White House.
On Friday, March 24, the morning of the theoretical House vote for the Republican
health care bill, Politico’s Playbook characterized the chances of a vote actually coming to
the floor as a “toss-up.” In that morning’s senior staff meeting, Cohn was asked for an
assessment of where things stood and promptly said, “I think it’s a toss-up.”
“Really?” thought Katie Walsh. “That’s what you think?”
Bannon, joining Walsh in a pitiless contempt for the White House effort, targeted
Kushner, Cohn, Priebus, Price, and Ryan in a series of calls to reporters. Kushner and
Cohn could, per Bannon, be counted on to run at the first sound of gunfire. (Kushner, in
fact, had spent much of the week on a skiing holiday.) Priebus mouthed Ryan talking
points and excuses. Price, supposedly the health care guru, was an oafish imposter; he
would stand up in meetings and mumble nothing but nonsense.
These were the bad guys, setting up the administration to lose the House in 2018,
thereby assuring the president’s impeachment. This was vintage Bannon analysis: a certain
and immediate political apocalypse that sat side by side with the potential for a half
century of Bannonism-Trumpism rule.
Convinced he knew the direction of success, keenly aware of his own age and finite
opportunities, and—if for no clear reason—seeing himself as a talented political infighter,
Bannon sought to draw the line between believers and sell-outs, being and nothingness.
For him to succeed, he needed to isolate the Ryan, Cohn, and Kushner factions.
The Bannon faction held tight on forcing a vote on the health care bill—even knowing
defeat was inevitable. “I want it as a report on Ryan’s job as Speaker,” said Bannon. That
is, a devastating report, an epic fail.
The day of the vote, Pence was sent to the Hill to make one last pitch to Meadows’s
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020011
Have a question about what this document contains?
Ask the documents