The Russians Are Coming | 229

The Russians Are Coming | 229 querade as members of the security services of Israel, South Africa, Germany, France, and the United States to recruit unwitting agents. These deceptions became an integral part of the recruitments of the Russian intelligence services. Penetrating the NSA and getting access to files from its stove- piped computers was a far more difficult challenge for the SVR. Approaching CIA officers, such as Nicholson, was relatively easy because it was part of the CIA officers’ jobs to meet with their adver- saries. NSA officers, on the other hand, did not engage in “dangles” or even attend diplomatic receptions. They had no reason, other than a sinister one, to meet with a member of the Russian intelligence service. Furthermore, unlike CIA officers, who, like Nicholson, are often posted in neutral countries where they can be approached in a social context, NSA officers work at well-guarded regional bases and are not part of the diplomatic life. Because a known employee of a foreign diplomatic mission could not even approach an NSA officer without arousing suspicion, the SVR would need to use an inter- mediary, called an access agent, whose affiliations were not known © to the FBI. Such an operation would require establishing a network © of illegals in America, as the SVR did after Putin became president. Even then, the intermediary would have to find a plausible pretext to approach the target without revealing his actual interest. Such complex operations at the NSA, as far as is known, only yielded a few low-level recruits. The emergence of computer networks in the 1990s greatly expanded the SVR’s recruiting horizon. It offered a new penetration opportunity at the NSA: civilian technologists working under con- tract for the U.S. government. Many of these civilians at the NSA, especially the younger ones, as we know, had been drawn from the hacking and game-playing culture; some had even taken courses on hacking techniques. They presented the SVR with inviting targets for recruitment. As was previously mentioned, Russian intelligence had considerable experience in Germany with hacktivists, who tended to be anarchists. There were also supporters of the libertar- ian movement. The common denominator was often their resent- ment, expressed in their postings, of the United States and its allies attempting to limit the downloading of copyrighted music, movies, | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 229 ® 9/30/16 8:13AM | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019717