exclusive alternatives. The point is to assure that any alternative that
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150 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS
exclusive alternatives. The point is to assure that any alternative that
fits the relevant facts, no matter how implausible it may initially
seem to be, is not neglected.
One of the most vexing problems that had to be explained by these
scenarios is how Snowden got the passwords to up to twenty-four of
these vaults. He could not have obtained these passwords during his
previous employment at Dell, because Dell technicians did not have
access to the Level 3 documents stored in these compartments. Nor,
as noted earlier, was he given access to them when he transferred to
Booz Allen, because he had not completed the requisite training.
Snowden had also, it will be recalled, relinquished his privileges as
a system administrator when he transferred to Booz Allen, so he did
not have the privilege to override password protection. In short, his
new position as an infrastructure analyst did not give him the ability
to enter compartments that he had not yet been read into.
As I've said, there are two possible ways he could have gotten
these passwords: either he had assistance from a party who had
access to them, or he found flaws in the NSA’s security procedures
© that left the supposedly closed vaults effectively unlocked. ®
The Unwitting Accomplice Possibility
It is possible that if Snowden received assistance, it was entirely
unwitting. He might have obtained some passwords through decep-
tion, such as tricking co-workers into typing their passwords into
a device that captured them. As the NSA informed Congress in
2014, three of his fellow workers told the FBI that Snowden might
have deceived them to gain access to their passwords. He could have
simply asked other analysts at the center who had been read into
compartments for their passwords. Such an approach would be
extremely risky for the analyst, who could lose his job and security
clearance by cooperating. It could also be risky for Snowden because
any analyst he approached was supposed to report any request for
a password to a security officer. Making such requests even more
suspicious, Snowden had been working at the Threat Operations
Center for just a few weeks as a trainee and was not well known to
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