bounties from money raised on the Internet. In 2015, for instance
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148 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS
bounties from money raised on the Internet. In 2015, for instance,
WikiLeaks offered $100,000 bounties to any whistle-blowers who
provided the site with secret documents exposing details of the
Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement.
Nor is acting alone necessarily a line that divides whistle-blowers
from spies. In many cases, whistle-blowers have accomplices who
help them carry out their mission. For example, in 1969, the cel-
ebrated whistle-blower Daniel Ellsberg, a military analyst at the
Rand Corporation, had an accomplice, Anthony Russo, who had also
worked at Rand. (Both were indicted by the government.) Acting in
concert, they copied secret documents that became known famously
as the Pentagon Papers.
Whistle-blowers can also, like conventional spies, enter into elabo-
rate conspiracies to carry out an operation. On the night of March 8,
1971, eight whistle-blowers working together with burglary tools
broke into the FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, and stole almost all
the FBI files there. The conspirators escaped and kept their identities
secret for over forty-two years.
© Self-definitions also do not necessarily produce a distinction ©
between whistle-blowers and conventional spies. Consider Philip
Agee, who left the CIA in 1969 for what he described as “reasons
of conscience.” Specifically, he said he objected to the CIA’s covert
support of Latin American dictators. After contacting the Soviet
embassy in Mexico City, he defected to Cuba, where he leaked infor-
mation that exposed CIA operations. Although Agee insisted he was
a whistle-blower, and he adamantly denied offering any secrets to the
Soviet Union, the KGB viewed him as a conventional spy. Accord-
ing to Oleg Kalugin, the top Soviet counterintelligence officer in the
KGB in Moscow, who defected to the United States, Agee offered
CIA secrets first to the KGB residency in Mexico City in 1973 and
then to the Cuban intelligence service. Agee provided the KGB with
a “treasure trove” of U.S. secrets, Kalugin revealed. “I then sat in
my office in Moscow reading the growing list of revelations coming
from Agee.” Despite this disparity, Agee still defined himself to the
public as a whistle-blower because he also had exposed CIA opera-
tions to the public.
The Snowden case blurs the demarcation line even further. Unlike
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HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019636
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