Enter Assange | 103
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Enter Assange | 103
Because Hong Kong had a vigorously enforced extradition agree-
ment with the United States, as mentioned above, it was expected
that Snowden would be taken into custody. But China had the final
say in any extradition decision. In fact, China had explicitly been
given the right of vetoing any extraditions for any reason in the
formal 1999 agreement between Hong Kong and the United States.
Because the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, had just met with Presi-
dent Obama in California, China also had an interest in avoiding
embarrassing public demonstrations on behalf of Snowden. Accord-
ing to a well-placed official in Hong Kong, China’s liaison office in
Hong Kong told the Hong Kong Authority in no uncertain terms
that Snowden had to be out of Hong Kong by June 23.
On June 19, Snowden had a meeting with Tibbo, the barrister who
would handle any eventual court case, and Man and Ho, the Hong
Kong solicitors who had been retained for him. It took place in a
small apartment where, according to Ho, they ate pizza while they
discussed Snowden’s options.
Tibbo wanted Snowden to remain in Hong Kong, allow himself
© to be arrested, seek bail, and fight extradition in court. Tibbo said ©
he planned to mount a powerful legal defense against extradition
by using a provision in Hong Kong’s extradition treaty with the
United States that protects fugitives from persecution on political
grounds. After he told Snowden that it would entail a long court
battle, Snowden asked him if he could avoid even being arrested.
Tibbo explained that Hong Kong courts, which closely follow
British law, would certainly issue an arrest warrant for him imme-
diately after the United States formally filed charges against him.
Those charges could come within hours, he reckoned. Soon after-
ward, Snowden would be temporarily jailed, and his computers,
electronic gear, and thumb drives would be seized and placed in the
custody of the court. Tibbo would immediately seek his release on
bail but could not guarantee an outcome because Snowden, who
had fled U.S. jurisdiction, might be considered a flight risk. If so,
Snowden could remain incarcerated during the long court battle.
During the litigation, Snowden would have a platform to make
his case against U.S. surveillance. Indeed, Tibbo’s strategy involved
building massive public support for Snowden’s cause. Once the U.S.
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HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019591
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