BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians

BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians Third, he signaled his support for majoritarianism, with its disdain for checks and balances and civil society, as opposed to the values of pluralism that are enshrined in liberal democratic practice. The message here is important. For many, illiberalism’s defining feature is intolerance toward minority groups: the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) community, Roma, Muslims, refugees and migrants of all sorts. But in Hungary and elsewhere, illiberal government signifies something much more compre- hensive than the prime minister asserting that “every single migrant poses a public security and terror risk,” and that refugees bring “gangs hunting down our women and daughters”*—two of Orban's more incen- diary declarations. The Hungarian leader is instead telling us that illiberal- ism involves a wholesale rejection of liberal values and democratic norms, with all that this implies for politics and governance. Fidesz’'s “reform” efforts have been less concerned with the repression of unpopular minori- ties than with the creation of a system in which the institutions of pluralism are hollowed out and the ruling party's dominance is assured over the long term. aving come to office with a two-thirds parliamen- tary majority in 2010, Orban was able to rewrite the constitution without the consent of the opposition. e rushed through a series of constitutional changes, cardinal laws (requiring a two-thirds vote to change or remove), and regular laws that had the effect of turn- ing the Hungarian political system upside down. Among the steps taken by Fidesz after its 2010 triumph: ¢ The Constitutional Court was overhauled so that Fidesz appointees became a majority and its jurisdiction was narrowed. ¢ The government eliminated the independent Fiscal Council, responsible for overseeing bud- getary policy, then replaced it with a new council under Fidesz control. ¢ Anewelection law created gerrymandered legis- lative districts that were favorable to Fidesz.® ¢ Orban gave voting rights to ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, who were likely to support Fidesz.’ ¢ The government created a new press authority whose chair and members were Fidesz loyalists. The authority was given wide-ranging powers to fine media outlets.’ While the measures listed above were some of the most notorious of the Fidesz initiatives, in some cases draw- ing critical attention from European oversight bodies, they represent only part of the campaign that has trans- formed Hungary into a full-fledged illiberal democracy. Perhaps the more far-reaching measures introduced under Orban have been in the economic sphere. Since 2010, Hungary has evolved into a crony capitalist state par excellence. But unlike in outright kleptocracies such as Russia, where the regime itself is organized around the plunder of public wealth by the ruling clique, Orban has used state laws and procurement contracts to create a wealthy Fidesz-affiliated business constituency that can finance political campaigns, re- ward party supporters, and operate friendly media out- lets. The enrichment of cronies is less an objective in itself than a means of fortifying the dominant political party against any future challenge from the opposition.® While Orban is highly unpopular in European liberal circles, he has gained a following among conserva- tives in both Europe and the United States. At a 2015 congressional subcommittee hearing in Washington, one Republican legislator after another defended the Fidesz government, often in ways that demonstrated blatant ignorance of political conditions in Budapest.'® Conservatives praise Orban for his commitment to traditional values and decisive leadership, but they ignore the course he has set for the economy. Since taking power in 2010, the prime minister has violated practically every principle of the free market and prudent economic stewardship. Were Hungary a developing state in Latin America or Africa, donor gov- ernments would likely have imposed special conditions on foreign assistance given the overt acts of corruption and cronyism that Fidesz has embraced as a matter of public policy. This includes a pattern of awarding gov- ernment contracts to businesses with Fidesz ties, the adoption of special laws to benefit Fidesz supporters in the business community, the use of punitive taxation against foreign-owned corporations, tax concessions for corporations controlled by Fidesz loyalists, and the granting of control over nationalized sectors of the economy to Fidesz supporters. In its relentless drive to hand economic power to its allies, Fidesz resembles the old-style political ma- 36 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019270