BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians
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BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians
up’ the agreement between British prime minister
Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler that resulted in
Germany's seizure of parts and eventually all of Czecho-
slovakia. This clearly falsified the historical record. Far
from suppressing Chamberlain's actions, historians and
politicians alike have held up the Munich agreement
as a symbol of all that went wrong due to the European
democracies’ appeasement of Hitler.”
Putin has also justified the Hitler-Stalin pact on the
grounds that it kept the Soviet Union out of war for a
time and was in keeping with the amoral power politics
practiced in that era. As for the divvying up of Eastern
Europe, he repeated the hoary lie that the record was
unclear as to whether the pact’'s secret protocols—in
which the two parties agreed on which territories each
would subsequently control—were genuine.’ Predict-
ably, Putin did not go into the unwritten parts of the
agreement that caused Stalin to forcibly repatriate a
group of German dissidents, mostly Communists, who
had sought refuge in the Soviet Union.
Both the history manual and the political leadership
justify the transformation of postwar Eastern Europe
into a Soviet-controlled bloc—in which the econ-
omy came under state control, religious belief was
persecuted, civil society was destroyed, the press was
converted into a monolithic instrument of propagan-
da, and opposition political parties were crushed—by
claiming that Moscow needed a layer of territorial
security to protect it from the hostile West. “Historical
necessity” is how Putin’s spokesman described Soviet
domination of the region. Putin likewise blames the
democracies for the Iron Curtain: “We understand the
fatality of an ‘iron curtain’ for us. We will not go down
this path. No one will build a wall around us.”
The manual recalls Mikhail Gorbachev not for his
attempts to reform and liberalize the Communist
system, but instead for his having permitted the
unraveling of the European security belt in 1989 and
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Moving into
the 21st century, the manual denounces the color
revolutions in neighboring countries like Georgia
and Ukraine as Western-backed schemes to replace
pro-Russian leaders with pro-American usurpers. In
this view, the centuries may change and the Soviet
empire may fade into history, but Russia's geopolitical
predicament remains constant.
Sakharov as nonperson
Because Putin is intent on blaming the West for Rus-
sias problems, both past and present, he has worked
to ensure that critical domestic voices are removed
from Russian history. This explains the near total ab-
sence of Andrey Sakharov from any discussion of the
Soviet past or Russia's future course.
Today Sakharov is recalled abroad as a dissident and
Nobel Peace Prize laureate. In Russia, however, he
has been relegated to the status of nonperson. Putin
and other leaders never refer to him, his legacy, or
his views. The organizations that were launched to
promote his principles are harassed and placed on the
“foreign agents’ list.*° In an age of flourishing digital
media, Russians are ironically less likely to know what
Sakharov stood for than was the case under Soviet
censorship, when underground samizdat literature
was reproduced on manual typewriters to reach an
audience of a few hundred.
In fact, Sakharov was an imposing global presence
from the mid-1960s until his death in 1989. His stat-
ure derived from his prominent role in the develop-
ment of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. He was sometimes
called the “father of the hydrogen bomb,” and because
of the respect he enjoyed in the global scientific com-
munity, his views on arms control carried enormous
weight.
His initial forays into political dissent consisted of cau-
tious statements about the importance of weapons
treaties between Washington and Moscow. But the
more he thought about arms control, the more closely
he looked at his own society. And soon he was making
caustic comments about the yawning gap between
Soviet boasts on the achievements of socialism and
the reality of Soviet backwardness.
He eventually came to see the system that prevailed
in the Soviet Union as inherently repressive. Sakharov
attributed Russia's epidemic of alcoholism to the
leadership's having purged the governing system of
moral considerations. He said it was “important that
our society gradually emerge from the dead end of
unspirituality.” He spoke of the need for the “system-
atic defense of human rights and ideals, and not a
political struggle, which would inevitably incite people
to violence, sectarianism, and frenzy."
The Kremlin has worked hard to make Russians forget
that he once ranked among the eminent figures of
global political protest. The current leadership is
especially determined to ensure that Sakharov's core
goals disappear from the debate: a Russia committed
to humane and democratic values, a government that
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