BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians
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BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians
Chapter 3
The Enemy Within: Civil Society at Bay
Among the more surprising developments in
21st-century politics are the reversals experienced by
civil society, once regarded as an irresistible force in
the global struggle for democracy.
According to Freedom in the World, the ability of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other
civil society institutions to function without state re-
strictions has suffered a pronounced decline over the
past decade. The setbacks have been concentrated in
authoritarian states like Russia, China, Venezuela, and
lran. But civil society has also met with growing prob-
lems in democracies—India and Indonesia among
them—and in settings where democracy’s prospects
are unclear, as with Ecuador, Hungary, and Kenya.
The growing offensive against civil society is in many
respects a tribute to the prominent role that NGOs
have come to play in the political life of most coun-
tries. An active civil society is often seen as a formida-
ble threat to a repressive or illiberal status quo. Civil
society was the linchpin in the successful popular
revolutions in Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia. In fact,
civil society organizations frequently pose a greater
threat to autocracy than do traditional opposition par-
ties, which have proven relatively easy for determined
strongmen to sideline, neutralize, or co-opt. Civil soci-
ety movements, by contrast, are generally composed
of younger activists, committed to a cause, more
resilient, more agile, and less prone to corruption.
To be sure, even some authoritarian states can boast
of an active and growing civil society sector consist-
ing of humanitarian organizations, religious entities,
conservation groups, associations focused on public
health or development, and so forth. It is with the
NGOs that pursue politically sensitive objectives—hu-
man rights advocacy, democratic reform, or anticor-
ruption measures—that oppressive leaders have
serious differences. Especially in countries where
elections have been rendered meaningless, civil soci-
ety groups can become surrogates for a democratic
opposition, and are therefore regarded with deep
suspicion by the leadership.
The specter of ‘color revolution’
The term “color revolution” emerged in 2003-05 to
describe a phenomenon whereby an existing politi-
cal leadership is overthrown by a popular movement
“Countries in western Asia and
northern Africa, Ukraine and Thai-
land, which have experienced street
protests and even armed conflicts,
have been led astray to the wrong
path of Western-style democracy,
that is, ‘street politics.’.. The United
States and some Western forces
have been involved in the street
politics in these countries, either on
stage or behind the scenes.”
—Xinhua, paraphrasing an editorial by MiBohua of the
People’s Daily
“In the modern world, extremism is
being used as a geopolitical instru-
ment and for remaking spheres of
influence. We see what tragic conse-
quences the wave of so-called color
revolutions led to... We should do
everything necessary so that noth-
ing similar ever happens in Russia.”
—Vladimir Putin
using tactics of nonviolent civil disobedience.
Successful nonviolent democratic revolutions are not
new. Perhaps the first color revolution took place in
1974, when a dictatorship in Portugal was overthrown
by military officers who drew on the support of civilian
democracy advocates. Later peaceful revolutions
overcame authoritarian regimes in the Philippines,
South Korea, Chile, and Poland.
In the 21st century, however, the definitive events
behind the new label took place in Georgia (2003) and
Ukraine (2004-5). Both countries were governed by
politicians with close ties to Moscow who were either
personally corrupt or tolerated high levels of graft.
In the Ukrainian elections of 2004, there was strong
evidence of rigging to ensure the victory of Viktor Ya-
nukovych, the candidate of the pro-Russian old guard.
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