assassination of Anwar Sadat on a calm afternoon in October 1981. Wisner arrived a
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assassination of Anwar Sadat on a calm afternoon in October 1981. Wisner arrived a
few years later. Though not quite a friend, Wisner had cultivated a directness at
least, with Mubarak. He’d become a mirror in which the Egyptian president might
see how different stances towards America or Israel would appear to the rest of the
world. So when, in the winter of 2011, the White House saw Mubarak facing waves
of unimagined protest, ata moment when it looked like the Egyptian president
would become the latest head of state to topple amidst the accelerating discontent
that would be known as the Arab Spring, they sent Wisner with a message for
Mubarak: No killing - and it is time for you to retire.
Wisner later recalled the tension of Cairo when he arrived. The city felt nervous ina
way he’d not seen before. He landed in the early morning and went almost
immediately to see the President. The situation would be brought back to normal,
Mubarak assured Wisner. Soon. He’d fired most of his cabinet a few days earlier. He
had promised reform, and had begun studying what might be done first, and how
soon it might be carefully attempted. He hinted to Wisner that the rumored
transition of power to his son Gamal was not, after all, inevitable. But, Mubarak said,
he wasn’t going anywhere just now.
Wisner tried another tack: He asked if the President would like to leave the country.
Maybe a trip for medical treatment? Mubarak dismissed the idea. He’d seen worse,
he reminded Wisner. Mubarak had been sitting inches away from Sadat on that
fateful October day in 1981. He himself had survived six assassination attempts. In
fact, he said he intended to go on television again that very evening. He would speak
directly to the protestors. He would tell them and the Egyptian people of his plans
for reform and for a gradual transition of power. He would remind them of the
greatness of their national spirit. He would evoke the immensity of their ancient
history. And he would be sure they understood that he would stay, he would die on
Egyptian soil. You can tell that to the White House too, Mubarak told Wisner. He
vouchsafed, at the end of their talk, at least some of the assurances the envoy had
come to collect: No violence. A graceful departure at some point. Elections, even. But
all on his timetable.
Around Mubarak in those days, Wisner recalled, he saw bafflement. Resolution
admixed with surprise. These men in that Egyptian power structure, all wealthy and
comfortable and perfectly secure, had thought their places impregnable. They were,
after all, the thin human line between the modern world and the boiling mad Islamic
fundamentalists who hungered to rule the country. They'd arrested the usual
dissidents, closed down the normal channels, checked with their informants.
Nothing. The old, reliable vents for unrest hadn’t worked. The pressures grew. It
was perhaps easy to understand why they thought they’d survive. They'd never
failed. Mubarak had been president for 30 years. For now, at least, the syllogistic
logic fluttering through the President’s own arguments reassured them: Egypt
wants stability. Only I can deliver stability. Therefore, Egypt wants me.
Wisner left the Presidential Palace. He reported what he’d learned back to
Washington and, work done, headed to the airport. That evening he found himself
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