WL 2997881, at *22 (citing First Capital

806 WL 2997881, at *22 (citing First Capital Asset Mgmt. v. Brickellbush, Inc. 218 F.Supp.2d 369, 395 (S.D.N.Y.2002)). As will be highlighted below, the complaints do not allege any specific facts from which the Court could infer that Prince Sultan, Prince Turki, Mohammed Abdullah Aljo- maih, Sheikh Hamad Al-Husani, or Abdul- rahman bin Mahfouz directed, controlled, or requested al Qaeda to undertake its terrorist activities. Nor are there any specific allegations of their knowledge of, or consent to those activities. See Daven- tree, 349 F.Supp.2d 736 at 762-63, 2004 WL 2997881, at *22 (finding no personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy theory be- cause there was no basis from which the court could impute to defendants the con- duct of their putative co-conspirators); Chrysler Capital Corp, T78 F.Supp. at 1266 (requiring specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy). Accordingly, for Prince Sultan, Prince Turki, Mo- hammed Abdullah Aljomaih, Sheik Hamad Al-Husani, and Abdulrahman bin Mah- fouz, personal jurisdiction cannot be based on a New York long-arm conspiracy theo- ry. The Court will examine the possibility of exercising conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction over the remaining moving De- fendants when it examines the specific claims against each of them below. 32. Although the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over any of the moving Defendants pursuant to the FSIA, that statute also provides for personal jurisdiction if ser- vice is proper and subject matter jurisdiction has been established. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign defen- dant shall exist as to every claim for relief of which the district courts have jurisdiction ... where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.’”’); Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F.Supp. 325, 329-330 (E.D.N.Y.1998). 33. The Federal Plaintiffs pursue claims under RICO, which some courts outside the Second 349 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES 2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k))(D), service of process will establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant when so authorized by a federal statute.” Here, the ATA contains a nationwide ser- vice of process provision, such that proper service will confer personal jurisdiction.” 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) (providing for nation- wide service of process and venue); Bur- nett [, 274 F.Supp.2d at 95-96. Courts asked to analyze personal jurisdiction un- der the ATA’s national service of process provision have concluded that a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy a traditional due process analysis.” Estates of Ungar v. Palestinan Auth, 153 F.Supp.2d 76, 95 (D.R.1.2001); see also Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth. 310 F.Supp.2d 172, 179 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing complaint pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333 because individual defen- dants lacked contacts with the United States). “The relevant inquiry under such circumstances is whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States as a whole [to satisfy Fifth Amend- ment due process requirements], rather than ... with the particular state in which the federal court sits.” Ungar, 153 F.Supp.2d at 87. Many of the moving Circuit have held also provides for nationwide service of process and jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965; Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir.1997) (finding 18 U.S.C. 8 1965(d) provides for nationwide jurisdic- tion); cf. PT United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 138 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir.1998) (finding “ 8 1965 does not provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction over ev- ery defendant in every civil RICO case, no matter where the defendant is found’). The Federal Plaintiffs do not use their RICO claims as a basis for personal jurisdiction and the Court focuses on the ATA. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017871