2007 Utah L. Rev. 861, *883
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2007 Utah L. Rev. 861, *883
representative. To eliminate any doubt about the ability of corporate entities to assert their interests, the Rules should be
amended to clearly state that a victim's representative can enforce victims' rights. '73
Rule 2 - Fairness to Victims The Proposals:
I proposed amending Rule 2 to require fairness to victims in construing the Rules as follows:
These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in
procedure and fairness in administration to the government, defendants, and victims, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and
delay. 134
The Advisory Committee did not propose amending Rule 2. !*°
Discussion:
To assure that crime victims are treated fairly throughout the process, it makes sense to add language incorporating crime
victims in Rule 2 - the one rule that specifically mentions fairness. As discussed in the previous Part of this Article, the
Advisory Committee does not agree that the Rules should be amended to protect a victim's right to fairness and for this reason,
presumably, declined to amend Rule 2. The qualifier "presumably" is needed here because the CVRA Subcommittee did not
give an explanation for declining to follow my recommendation here. 146
The fairness issues appears to be the fundamental difference between my approach and the Advisory Committee's approach -
the Rules are either going to treat crime victims fairly or not. As discussed in the previous Part of this Article, they should.
But even those who share my view on fairness might nonetheless argue that Rule 2 need not be amended because it is an
interpretive rule with no substantive effect. After all, it could be argued, the rule simply calls for a "just determination" of
criminal cases, arguably a symbolic command. And, in any event, that command might be flexible enough to encompass crime
victims.
[*884] The debate about how Rule 2 ought to read is, however, about more than symbols. In 1946, the initial chairman of the
Advisory Committee called Rule 2 "the most important rule of the whole set." !37 Rule 2 has been cited by a number of courts,
138 including the Supreme Court. !39 Rule 2 has consequences. Not only does it "set[] forth a principle of interpretation" for
judge could not require the wrongdoers to pay restitution ... ."); United States v. Kirkland, 853 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Non-human
entities ... can be "victims! entitled to restitution ... ."); see also United States v. Lincoln, 277 F.3d 1112, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing
18 U.S.C. § 3664, which specifically recognizes the United States as a possible victim for restitution purposes).
133 The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has proposed adding a “factfinding" hearing for determining who qualifies as a
victim under the CVRA. This novel and cumbersome proposal is discussed below. See infra notes 546-547 and accompanying text
(discussing Proposed Rule 60(b)).
34 Cassell, Proposed Amendments, supra note 4, at 858.
35 Proposed Amendments, supra note 71.
36 See CVRA Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, at 17-20 (listing Cassell proposals not adopted; Rule 2 proposal not listed).
37 Vanderbilt, N.Y.U Institute of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at 120 (1946), quoted in 1 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Criminal § 32, at 30 n.1 (3d ed. 1999).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 363 F.3d 11691174 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 237 (5th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 723 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1378 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Green, 847 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hillard, 701]
F.2d 1052, 1061 2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 461 U.S. 958 (1983); United States v. Broadus, 664 F. Supp. 592, 596-98 (D.D.C. Cir. 1987);
United States v. Pers. Fin. Co. of N.Y., 13 F.R.D. 306, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
139 See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 424, 431 (1996).
DAVID SCHOEN
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017651
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