States because the channels of democracy had been blocked by malapportioned legislatures and

4.2.12 WC: 191694 States because the channels of democracy had been blocked by malapportioned legislatures and other perversions of the democratic process. Over a period of years, the Supreme Court placed its moral imprimatur on desegregation and eventually unblocked these channels of democracy. It worked — not perfectly, but perfection is rarely possible in a heterogeneous and divided democracy. A similar process is today underway with regard to equality for gays. Abortion is different. The Supreme Court’s decision, now more half a century old, changed few minds on this issue, because those who believe that abortion — or certain kinds of abortion — is tantamount to murder are not like those who believed that segregation was right. The former believe that they occupy the moral high ground. And they do, if their underlying premise — that a fetus is a human being — is correct. No rational argument, whether made by philosophers or Supreme Court justices, will ever disprove the truth of that a priori premise. Nor will experience alter it, unlike views concerning segregation or gay rights which have been markedly changed by experience. Moreover, the nation was — and remains — closely divided about the morality of abortion, both in the abstract and under various circumstances. Advocates of a woman’s right to choose abortion could have organized politically to win that right (at least for most women under most circumstances) in the elected branches of government. According to the ACLU: Between 1967 and 1971, under mounting pressure from the women’s rights movement, 17 states decriminalized abortion. Public opinion also shifted during this period. In 1968, only 15 percent of Americans favored legal abortions; by 1972, 64 percent did. When the Court announced its landmark 1973 ruling legalizing abortion in Roe v. Wade, it was marching in step with public opinion. But it is not the proper role of the Supreme Court to march “in step” with public opinion. That is the role of the elected branches of government. Instead of devoting all their resources to continuing the legislative and public opinion battle, the pro-choice movement devoted much of its resources to the litigation option, whose goal it was to get the Supreme Court to constitutionalize a woman’s right to choose abortion. It worked as planned, thus sparing the pro-choice movement the difficult political task of organizing and fundraising on a state-by-state basis. The justices did the work for them, by simply striking down most abortion laws in one fell swoop. The short-term consequences of constitutionalizing the abortion issue were powerful and positive for the choice movement. The long-term consequences were disastrous. Roe v. Wade provided the Religious Right and the conservative wing of the Republican Party one of the best organizing tools and rallying cries imaginable. The right-to-life movement was energized by this decision and became one of the most potent political forces both nationally and in a large number of states. At the same time, the pro-choice movement became lethargic, celebrating its great judicial victory and neglecting the hard work of organizing and fundraising — at least in the beginning. As the ACLU has put it: ... the backlash was swift and fierce. Anti-choice forces quickly mobilized, dedicating themselves to reversing Roe. In 1974, the ACLU established its 314 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017401