103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *906

Page 32 of 42 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *906 prosecutors to reverse their earlier non-prosecution decisions (or, occasionally, to appointing substitute prosecutors). This "executive separation of powers" model has proven effective, although whether it is effective enough is debated; it depends on whether all cases of police violence that should have been prosecuted - based on the evidence and the public interest in enforcement - were prosecuted. State and federal prosecution offices have distinct professional cultures and are responsive to different constituencies and modes of political supervision, which increases the independence of one from the other. 7!? On the other hand, federal prosecution is still to some degree political; it varies with the policy priorities of presidential administrations 714 to a degree that judicial review [*907] (in theory) should not. When there is less federal commitment to oversight of states’ approaches to police violence, enforcement redundancy is weak. 7!° Victims and other interested parties have no other recourse. C. Underenforcement and Prosecutor Political Accountability In short, U.S. strategies of enforcement redundancy have a relatively strong track record for some crimes such as public corruption, are robust but vulnerable to political shifts for others such as a police violence, and are notably weak with regard to certain offenses, such as sexual assaults. That last category is important because that weakness extends well beyond sexual assault offenses; many of the routine crimes that make up typical state criminal dockets are not within the scope of federal criminal law enforcement. And since private prosecution and judicial or administrative review of prosecutorial decisions are almost completely absent from state criminal justice systems, there is no charging-decision oversight of state prosecutors’ declination decisions and enforcement policies - save for local electoral accountability. In forty-five of fifty states, chief prosecutors are directly elected in local constituencies. *!© This form of democratic accountability operates as a kind of check on underenforcement, although it has significant limits in its capacity to play that role. State prosecutors’ elected status is likely the best explanation [*908] for why victim-based checks on declination - private prosecution or judicial review - never became a part of victims' rights reforms enacted in U-S. jurisdictions in recent decades. First, prosecutors are politically powerful groups with legislatures, and they zealously guard their unfettered discretion over criminal charging. *!7 Second, it has led even courts to disfavor any degree of judicial review of charging decisions, on the On Justice Department professionalism, see Jim McGee & Brian Duffy, Main Justice: The Men and Women Who Enforce the Nation's Criminal Laws and Guard Its Liberties 7-9 (1996); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service,66 Stan. L. Rev. 121, 125-26 (2014). 142 The arguable exceptions are federal crimes for race-based and civil rights-related violence and for local officials’ abuses of power; in those realms federal authorities responded to widespread failures by state law enforcement and justice systems. See generally Michal R. Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order: Racial Violence and Constitutional Conflict in the Post-Brown South 154-58 (1987) (highlighting the federal response to southern violence in mid-twentieth century); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The FBI: A History 19-24 (2007) (tracing FBI to nineteenth century federal efforts to combat Ku Klux Klan terrorism of voters); William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 99-157 (2011) (documenting the expansion of federal role in law enforcement and prosecution in the late nineteenth century). 43° See infra Part III.B.1. I44 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 110-14 (1945). 45 For an indication that federal enforcement policy is designed to protect specific victim interests, see U.S. Dep't of Justice, FY 2014 Annual Performance Report and FY 2016 Annual Performance Plan 1-16-17 (2015), hittps://www. justice. gov/sites/default/files/doj/pages/attachments/2015/02/06/{v2014aprfv_20]6app2.pdf (describing aspects of the "Vulnerable People Priority Goal"). 46 See Lichtblau, supra note 141. 47 See Paul G. Cassell & James R. Marsh, Full Restitution for Child Pornography Victims: The Supreme Court's Paroline Decision and the Need for a Congressional Response, /3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 1, 7 (2015). 48 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 145, at I-22, I-33 (describing prioritization of federal prosecutions into financial or government fraud and child exploitation). 49 See Jane Kim, Taking Rape Seriously: Rape as Slavery, 35 Harv. J.L. & Gender 263, 277-83 (2012) (criticizing inadequate federal criminalization of rape); Donald A. Dripps, Why Rape Should Be a Federal Crime 4 (2018), (unpublished manuscript), DAVID SCHOEN HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_016541