158 8 Cognitive Synergy
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158 8 Cognitive Synergy
e The Wozniak "coffee test": go into an average American house and figure out how to make
coffee, including identifying the coffee machine, figuring out what the buttons do, finding
the coffee in the cabinet, etc.
e Story understanding — reading a story, or watching it on video, and then answering questions
about what happened (including questions at various levels of abstraction)
e Graduating (virtual-world or robotic) preschool
e Passing the elementary school reading curriculum (which involves reading and answering
questions about some picture books as well as purely textual ones)
e Learning to play an arbitrary video game based on experience only, or based on experience
plus reading instructions
One interesting point about tests like this is that each of them seems to some AGI researchers
to encapsulate the crux of the AGI problem, and be unsolvable by any system not far along
the path to human-level AGI — yet seems to other AGI researchers, with different conceptual
perspectives, to be something probably game-able by narrow-AI methods. And of course, given
the current state of science, there’s no way to tell which of these practical tests really can be
solved via a narrow-AI approach, except by having a lot of people try really hard over a long
period of time.
A question raised by these observations is whether there is some fundamental reason why
it’s hard to make an objective, theory-independent measure of intermediate progress toward
advanced AGI. Is it just that we haven’t been smart enough to figure out the right test — or is
there some conceptual reason why the very notion of such a test is problematic?
We don’t claim to know for sure — but in the rest of this section we’ll outline one possible
reason why the latter might be the case.
8.7.2 A Possible Answer: Cognitive Synergy is Tricky!
Why might a solid, objective empirical test for intermediate progress toward AGI be an in-
feasible notion? One possible reason, we suggest, is precisely cognitive synergy, as discussed
above.
The cognitive synergy hypothesis, in its simplest form, states that human-level AGI in-
trinsically depends on the synergetic interaction of multiple components (for instance, as in
CogPrime, multiple memory systems each supplied with its own learning process). In this hy-
pothesis, for instance, it might be that there are 10 critical components required for a human-
level AGI system. Having all 10 of them in place results in human-level AGI, but having only
8 of them in place results in having a dramatically impaired system — and maybe having only
6 or 7 of them in place results in a system that can hardly do anything at all.
Of course, the reality is almost surely not as strict as the simplified example in the above
paragraph suggests. No AGI theorist has really posited a list of 10 crisply-defined subsystems
and claimed them necessary and sufficient for AGI. We suspect there are many different routes
to AGI, involving integration of different sorts of subsystems. However, if the cognitive synergy
hypothesis is correct, then human-level AGI behaves roughly like the simplistic example in the
prior paragraph suggests. Perhaps instead of using the 10 components, you could achieve human-
level AGI with 7 components, but having only 5 of these 7 would yield drastically impaired
functionality — etc. Or the point could be made without any decomposition into a finite set
of components, using continuous probability distributions. To mathematically formalize the
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_013074
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