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Chimpanzees also suffer, experiencing pain from both physical attacks and social loss. But getting a

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Chimpanzees also suffer, experiencing pain from both physical attacks and social loss. But getting angry at something or someone and feeling pain from a physical or social assault are different from getting angry because someone’s behavior was morally wrong, and suffering from a morally toxic action. I get angry at my computer all the time, swearing when it crashes, and even smacking it on its backside. But there is no moral harm. In this sense, there is no evidence that chimpanzees have a sense of right and wrong, and that the pain they experience is linked to a sense of how one ought to behave. Chimpanzees can’t be evildoers, but they certainly can, and have been evilrecipients. There is also an important difference between violently harming another and knowing it is wrong, and harming another because it is wrong. The latter fits at least one view of evil, a kind of radical evil in which harm is created for harm’s sake, because it is rewarding. When Willie Bosket killed those two men, he was certainly old enough to know the difference between right and wrong. He most likely killed knowingly, perhaps for the generic experience of shooting someone, but perhaps not with a desire to harm for harm’s sake. Then again, when he noted that he killed for the experience, perhaps this was the experience of pleasure from harming another. Was Willie Bosket responsible for his shootings? The answer to this question depends on how we think about Bosket’s options, and the link between cause and effect. At the simplest level, Bosket caused the death of the two men in the same way that a swinging wrecking ball can cause the death of two men. But the wrecking ball can’t be held accountable or responsible in the same way that Bosket can. Wrecking balls lack options and lack the capacity to predict the consequences of their actions. Bosket had options, could foresee the consequences of his actions, and had the capacity to act upon his options. Or did he? We know that the frontal lobes of the brain play an important role in self-control and emotional regulation. We also know that this area of the brain is not fully mature until people reach their mid- twenties. Bosket was, therefore, operating with an immature brain. His actions were, in some ways, like the wrecking ball, driven by inertia. Perhaps the frustration of failing to achieve his goal — robbery — caused a dizzying chemical reaction in his brain, causing a flood of emotions, blinding his capacity to think rationally. Paraphrasing the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek, these electrochemical storms in Bosket’s brain caused him to deposit his conscience at the door. Like the husband who finds his wife in bed with her lover and kills them both on the spot, Bosket committed a crime of passion. On this account, not only is he not evil, he is pardonable. Immaturity is a mitigating factor when we evaluate a crime. It is why, in many countries, there is one legal system for youths and another for adults. It is why, in countries with the death penalty, such as the United States, youths are immune. With maturity comes a heightened capacity to control ones actions, or at least, to gain better self-control and thus, to take responsibility for what one does. This Hauser Chapter 3. Ravages of denial 88 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_012834

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