But both Olmert and Tzipi soon fell prey to the same self-defeating temptation
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But both Olmert and Tzipi soon fell prey to the same self-defeating temptation
that had worried me during the meandering war against Hizbollah. Our ground
incursion began a few days into the operation. The intention was to stay for a few
more days and then, responding to inevitable international appeals, call a halt to a
campaign that had already achieved nearly all of its targets. Perhaps wanting to
balance the failures in Lebanon there with “success” in Gaza, Olmert wanted us to
continue, and expand our attacks deeper into Gaza. I reminded him that we’d
agreed the aims beforehand. The longer we stayed, the less clear any gains would
be. Yes, our ground forces had so far faced virtually no resistance or casualties.
“But that’s because we’re outside the main populated areas,” I said. “The deeper
we get in, the better it will be for Hamas. They gain simply by surviving, like
Hizbollah.” Yet Olmert kept insisting that we’d succeeded so far, so let’s not stop.
It wasn’t until January 17, three weeks after the operation began, that we
announced a cease-fire. Militarily, the operation was a success. While Hamas
launched nearly 3,000 rockets into Israel in the year before our attack, there were
only 300 in the year that followed. But politically and diplomatically, the extra
week reduced, rather than helped, the chances of reaching an understanding for a
longer-term reduction of the attacks. To the extent there was any political gain, it
was to burnish Tzipi Livni’s credentials as a tough potential Prime Minister ahead
of the election. That was not her intent. Of all the politicians I’ve known, she is
among the least interested in such games, especially with lives at stake. But it was
one of the effects.
She won the election, in a photo finish, with opinion polls suggesting she’d
been effective in shaping the campaign as a choice “between Tzipi and Bibi.”
Kadima got 28 Knesset seats, to 27 for Bibi and the Likud, which gave her the first
crack at forming a government. There’s no way of disguising the fact that Labor’s
result in my first election back in charge was a disappointment. We went down six
seats, to 13. The big gainer was a far-right, stridently anti-Arab party called Yisrael
Beitenu, led by a former Likudnik named Avigdor Lieberman. Tzipi’s attempt to
form a coalition became less a political process than a contest between rival stalls
in a Middle Eastern bazaar. Bibi was holding parallel talks with the Orthodox
parties critical to assembling a parliamentary majority. He was matching and
raising every assurance of a ministerial seat or budgetary concession that Tzipi was
prepared to offer. In the end, she threw up her hands, saying she refused to draw
out a process which was not so much a negotiation as organized extortion. I am
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