points. It would amount to retaining control over around 20 percent of the West
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/ BARAK / 103
points. It would amount to retaining control over around 20 percent of the West
Bank, but none of the major Arab towns or cities. Though deliberately stopping
well short of share of the West Bank Arafat could have secured through a
negotiated peace, it would remove Israeli troops and settlers from most of the
territory. It would give the Palestinians ample room to set up a state if they so
chose, and conceivably to expand its area if some future leader had more of the
“Ben-Gurion” in him than Arafat. Until then, it would allow both of our peoples to
get on with their lives and focus on their own political and social and economic
challenges.
There was a second, critically important part to what I was proposing: the
construction of a physical security fence along the new “disengagement line” with
the West Bank. It was the suggestion rejected under Rabin, accepted under Peres
amid the Hamas bombings in the 1996 election campaign, but never followed
through on. Even under the new arrangement I envisaged, Israeli troops would
retain the freedom of action to respond to, or pre-empt, terror attacks with targeted
operations inside the West Bank. But the physical barrier would hugely increase
our ability to halt the attackers before they could strike.
Yet even if I’d been able to bring those on the left of Labor behind the plan, this
election campaign was going to be a lot tougher than in 1999. Since Knesset
members weren’t running for their seats, the Labor machine lacked its usual
incentive put up posters, knock on doors, or get out the vote. Arik, however,
benefited from the enthusiasm of Likudniks and other right-wing activists who saw
an opportunity to retake control of Israel’s political agenda.
Long before election day, I realized my time as Prime Minister was up. Before
the campaign began, an old friend of mine, a leading Israeli journalist, tried to talk
me into withdrawing. “You’re going to lose, Ehud,” he said. “Why, after making
all this effort for peace, after doing your best, do you want the last act to be losing
to Arik?” I'd never seen the objective as just staying in office. If that had been the
case, I wouldn’t have put the chances of a peace deal with Syria to their final test. I
wouldn’t have gone to Camp David. I also would have accepted Arik’s serial
offers to join a unity coalition. But never in my life had I walked away from a
challenge. I certainly wasn’t going to retreat in the midst of Palestinian violence,
and when Israel still faced key decisions on how to move on from Arafat’s
unreadiness to negotiate an end to our decades-old conflict.
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