perfectly. No missiles would actually be shot. This stage was for the telemetry
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perfectly. No missiles would actually be shot. This stage was for the telemetry.
Once that was done, the soldier-actors would be replaced with wooden targets
and the real munitions would be tested.
The young soldiers stated chatting to one another, and milling about,
simulating as best we could the circumstances in which we expected to target
Saddam if the operation got final approval. In theory, within a minute, two
minutes at most, we would get word that the preliminary mock-firing sequence
had gone perfectly — at which point the artillery-range targets would be brought
in for the live test. But suddenly, there was an explosion. A split second of
silence. Then pandemonium. There was no need to know, and no time to
wonder, what exactly had gone wrong, or how it had been allowed to happen. It
was obvious to all of us that the /ive missiles had been fired. We sprinted
forward. When we got to the group of soldiers, we could see that four of the
young men were dead. Another was fighting for his life. Several others were
also wounded.
A sayeret medic and several senior officers were trying to save the most
badly injured man, but I knew I needed to get military doctors and medical
evacuation helicopters in immediately if we were to save the lives of the injured
soldiers. I had a mobile phone, but couldn’t get a signal. I ran toward a slightly
higher area a few dozen yards away and managed to get through to the kirya. I
issued orders for the nearby training base in Tze’elim and an air force near
Beersheva to dispatch helicopters to treat and evacuate the wounded.
We heard the first chopper about 25 minutes later, but it seemed initially
unable to see us, because it flew on before returning and landing two minutes
later. By that time, a medical team from the base in Tze’ elim had arrived. Ten
minutes later, two other medevac choppers landed. But the soldier who had
been worst wounded could not be saved. After the doctors had been there about
20 minutes, I again retreated to the area where I could get a mobile signal, and
phoned Rabin to tell him what had happened. We agreed I should come back to
brief him in detail. It was now about 50 minutes since the missiles had hit. The
wounded were all being treated. One of the helicopters had taken off for
Beersheva Hospital. Another two, including a heavier Sikorsky transport
helicopter, were preparing to leave. I arranged for Amnon, military intelligence
chief Shmuel Arad and me to return to the kirya. I told Amiram to stay until he
had confirmed all the injured had been evacuated, and talk to everyone involved
to get a preliminary idea of why and how the tragedy had happened.
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HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011719
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