Rabin’s closest aide, whom I knew well, was aware that Unit 8200 had
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Arafat
Rabin
Ehud
Hafez al-Assad
Amnon Lipkin
Dan Shomron
Amir Drori
Leah
Nissim Mishal
Moshe Vechetzi
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Rabin’s closest aide, whom I knew well, was aware that Unit 8200 had
intercepts that laid bare the details, and left no doubt the murderers were from a
PLO group. He called and asked me to appear on a weekly television interview
program called Moked. It was hosted by Nissim Mishal: brash, incisive, and one
of Israel’s best-known broadcast journalists. I pointed out to the Rabin aide that
I’d never done anything like this before. But he insisted it would go well. He
briefed me on the questions I could expect, not just about the Achille Lauro but
the wider issue of Palestinian attacks, as well as Syrian President Hafez al-
Assad’s efforts to re-equip his air force after his losses in Lebanon. So I came to
the interview prepared. I brought audio tapes of the hijackers, and a large
photograph of the MiG-25s which the Syrians were seeking to acquire.
My appearance will not go down in the annals of great moments in
television. But at the time, very few Israelis even knew who I was, and I felt ’'d
done OK. I was surprised, however, when Rabin phoned the next day. “Ehud, I
didn’t see it. I was attending some event,” he said. But his wife, Leah, had
recorded the program. “I just watched it. I should tell you, I think it was
exceptional. You did a great job. It was highly important for us, for the army,
and, I dare say, for you.”
I was not sure what he meant by saying it might be good for me as well,
although a decade later, at the end of my army career, he would play the central
role into my entry into Israeli politics. It is true that there was also some politics
at the upper reaches of the military as well, especially around the choice of chief
of staff, and that Moshe Vechetzi’s term had only a year-and-a-half to go. But I
didn’t view myself as a serious candidate at this stage. Moshe’s own preference
seemed to be either Amir Drori, the head of the northern command during the
Lebanon War, or Amnon Lipkin, the veteran paratroop commander who’d been
with me on the Rue Verdun raid in Beirut. My own hope was that the nod
would go to any even closer friend of mine: Dan Shomron.
I had first got to know Dan well in the late sixties after Karameh, Israel’s
costly standoff with Arafat, when Fatah’s influence was in its infancy. We
exchanged impressions on what had gone wrong, and why? When I became
commander of Sayeret Matkal, we remained in touch, and he took a close
interest in all of our operations. We also crossed paths in the Sinai in the 1973,
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