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The two other Israeli invasion forces had crossed the border parallel to us

Ref IMAGES-001-HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011669.txt Release House Oversight Committee — Epstein Estate Records (Nov 2025) 1 pages

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The two other Israeli invasion forces had crossed the border parallel to us, one pushing up through the steep hills and twisting valleys of central Lebanon, and the other along the Mediterranean coast. The central force was now ordered to mount an attack that would bring them within striking distance of the Beirut- Damasus road. The first skirmish came in the hilltop town of Jezzin, still barely within the 40-kilometer zone. The Syrians had a commando force and tanks in the town. An Israeli battalion was ordered in, and it took Jezzin by the evening of June 8. But it came under assault from Syrian units with grenades, RPGs and Saggers, as well as shellfire from a nearby ridge. Shortly before midnight, another unit of Israeli tanks and infantry passed through the central Lebanese village of Ayn Zhalta, to the north of Jezzin and beyond the 40-kilometer line, and began winding its way through a valley toward the Beirut-Damascus road. They waded into a Syrian ambush, and for hours found themselves in a fierce battle with Syrian units. I don’t believe Arik specifically planned to confront the Syrians in Jezzin and Ayn Zhalta. But he could not have doubted that, grven the enormous scale and range of our invasion, a clash with Syrian forces would happen at some point. Now that it had, all that remained was for him to tell the cabinet that Israeli forces had come under Syrian fire and insist, as defense minister, that the imperative for our forces on the ground was to strike back. On the afternoon of June 9, the fourth day of the war, we got the order to go on the offensive against the Syrians in the Bekaa. As our artillery pounded the southernmost SAM sites, nearly 100 Israeli jets swarmed into the Bekaa Valley and attacked Syria’s air defenses in eastern Lebanon. When a second wave screamed in an hour later, the Syrians sent up their Soviet-made MiGs to intercept them. Forty-one Syrian planes were shot down. Seventeen of the 19 SAM batteries were destroyed by the end of the day. The other two were taken out the next morning, and another 43 Syrian jets shot down. There was no longer any pretence about our war aim: to fight our way through any resistance and reach the Beirut-Damascus road. But after the Bekaa air battle, and the most serious air losses for an Arab state since 1967, Yanoush and I knew that international pressure for a cease-fire would quickly escalate. Aware we were racing against the clock, we began a co-ordinated push towards the Beirut-Damascus road. The left arm of our “pincer” was ordered to make its way toward a town called Jobb Janine. It was still some distance from the Damascus road, but an important way-station: Syrian headquarters on the western side of the Bekaa Valley. The eastern part of our pincer, the 252" 198 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011669

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