been doing on the Israeli 707. I told him I’d need another two hours to make
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been doing on the Israeli 707. I told him I’d need another two hours to make
sure my men had practiced climbing up on the wings and forcing open the
doors, and another hour for preparations and briefings for the teams who would
be participating in the operation. “By about half an hour after midnight, we’ll be
ready to deploy,” I said, though from his stoic, nearly silent response I couldn’t
be sure whether he was in favor of an assault. “By 0100, we’ll be ready to act.”
Both of us went back to see Dado. He seemed encouraged, especially when I
said we’d be ready to move by one in the morning. He told me the pilot of the
plane had been in contact with the control tower. He was an RAF veteran and,
though the terrorists seemed unaware of this, he was also Jewish. The hijackers
were demanding more than 300 Arab prisoners be released and flown to Cairo.
“And they seem quite nervous.”
Returning to the hangar, I sent Shai Agmon with four soldiers to set up a
lookout and sniper post about 70 yards to the side of the Sabena jet. I told him
not to open fire unless they were sure there had been shooting inside the plane
and could positively identify an armed hijacker. By now, we had three dozen
soldiers and officers, including Uzi Dayan and his full team. I took all those
who were already briefed and divided them into four groups, each with an
officer and five soldiers and assigned to deal with one of the wing doors. I left
the others to continue training.
When midnight came, I was far from certain we could meet the 12:30 am
deployment target I’d given Talik. Incoming flights had stopped for the night,
and we still hadn’t managed to bring in any air marshals. I believed they would
give us a crucial advantage. They knew Berettas. They also knew the inside of a
707. But I was worried about losing Dado’s trust in a sayeret operation if we
failed to meet the timeline. From Shai’s lookout post to the side of the plane, I
learned that the front cabin door of the plane was open. He said he’d seen a
couple of hijackers walking by it, silhouetted by the dim cabin light. But
otherwise, there was no sign of activity inside. I called Talik and told him I was
taking my assault teams to the area behind the plane. About a half-hour later, I
confirmed we were ready to begin the operation. Although the plane’s engines
were off now, our approach had been masked by the drone of the generator
brought in to supply power to the cabin. We were lying face-down on the
tarmac, directly behind the tail of the plane but well back. Two rows of 12 men,
plus me and a soldier in charge of the communications. We’d brought along
four small ladders to help us onto the wings. “We want to exploit the darkness,
and the sound of the generator, to cover us,” I said in my final briefing before
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