was always the principle of targeted force, the idea that we would take out
Epstein Suite indexes the text; the original document lives at its official source. We don't host the original file — view it on the official release to read it in full.
View the original on the official releaseDocument text
Text is machine OCR and may contain errors. Confirm against the original source above.
was always the principle of targeted force, the idea that we would take out
targets, or defeat enemies, out of military necessity. But even on the first day of
the war, it was clear that it would be by far the most consequential conflict in
our country’s history. There was no mission for Sayeret Matkal, nor, it seemed,
any prospect of our playing any significant part.
The fact that my own role was slightly less peripheral was due to Avraham
Arnan. He phoned me almost as soon as we’d got news of the Israeli air victory,
and told me he had been told to take a few men from the sayeret across the
southern border. Our assignment was to complete our failed attempt to defuse
the booby-trap on the intercept in the Sinai. I quickly drafted in two others from
the unit. One was Danny Michaelson, a friend from Hebrew University, where
we had been lab partners. The other was Rafi Friedman, our paramedic, who
had been with me on several of our missions on the Golan.
Avraham arrived at the base around noon. I got a Jeep and we set off. We
crossed into Egypt around four o’clock in the afternoon and headed for the field
headquarters of Israel Tal. Known as Talik, he was the commander of Israel’s
armored corps, and Avraham knew him well. His wartime division consisted of
the country’s premier tank unit, the Seventh Armored Brigade, and a reserve
brigade. We accompanied them the next day to an abandoned Egyptian camp
not far from El Arish, in the northern Sinai. At least, we’d assumed it was
abandoned. As Talik and Avraham were talking in his command post, we heard a
sudden burst of gunfire, which seemed to come from just a few dozen yards
outside. As everyone inside the command post looked around, Avraham turned
to me and said: “Ehud, don’t you think we ought to deal with it?” Then, to
Talik: “Make sure none of your guys shoots him.”
I got Danny and Rafi. We made our way toward an underground bunker,
which seemed the most likely source of the gunfire. Hugging the wall as I led
the way down a series of concrete steps, I clicked off the safety on my Uzi just
in case. But with the main Egyptian forces in obvious retreat, I figured that
whoever was doing the shooting would have to be shellshocked, or insanely
brave, to put up a fight. There were eight men crouched inside, soldiers and
several staff officers cradling Kalashnikovs, and an Egyptian army general. In
what was obviously at least serviceable Arabic, I told them all to raise their
hands. I made a brief attempt to interrogate the general, but quickly reached the
limits of my linguistic proficiency. So we marched them away and handed them
over to Talik’s intelligence officers.
89
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011560
Have a question about what this document contains?
Ask the documents